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ERIE, THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT, AND SOME




The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) expands diversity
jurisdiction to allow most significant class actions based on state law
to proceed in federal court. Hoping to limit the application of state
law through class actions, CAFA's supporters believe that federal
judges harbor a collective animosity toward the large, multistate
class actions the statute targets. CAFA has no substantive compo-
nent, and it does not tighten Rule 23's certification requirements.
Nonetheless, if supporters are right about judicial preferences and
their likely impact on certification decisions, CAFA will weaken the
regulatory reach of state law.
Arguments about diversity jurisdiction and judicial preferences
made during CAFA debates bear a number of striking resemblances
to arguments made for and against diversity jurisdiction during the
decades leading up to Erie Railroad v. Tompkins. Many Progressive
Era lawyers believed that, although no positive law instructed them
to do so, federal judges shared a set of policy preferences that made
them particularly receptive to corporate interests. As an expression
of these preferences, the general common law attracted attention for
its interference with the application of state law. By destroying the
general common law, Erie limited the implications of judicial
preferences for the federalism balance of power.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law. B.A.,
Harvard College, 1998; J.D., Yale Law School, 2002. This Article benefitted from feedback
received after presentation at the University of Arizona, the University of Maryland, and
Loyola Law School (Los Angeles). I owe particular thanks to the Hon. William Fletcher,
Barbara Babcock, Robert Rabin, Norman Spaulding, Mark Kelman, Barbara Atwood, and,
above all, Nina Rabin for comments on ideas and earlier drafts.
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This Article examines the similar justifications given for diversity
jurisdiction during the decades leading up to Erie and during the
debates over CAFA. It describes a shift in approaches to choice-of-law
problems in class actions as evidence of a hostility in federal courts
toward the cases that come within CAFA's reach. The Article then
uses Erie to criticize CAFA's federalism implications. Erie stands for
the proposition that Congress, not judicial preferences unmoored
from positive law, should bear responsibility for the displacement of
state law. To achieve its intended effect, CAFA will rely on a
perceived hostility toward large state law class actions in federal
courts rather than a positive instruction from Congress. The statute
thus contradicts Erie's message about the proper role federal judges
should play in the federalism balance of power.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1923, Louis Brandeis complained to his prot6g6, then-Professor
Felix Frankfurter, that few of his colleagues on the U.S. Supreme
Court "realize that questions of jurisdiction are really questions of
power between States and Nation."' At the time, Brandeis, a
committed federalist, was dissenting repeatedly as the Supreme
Court, under the guidance of Chief Justice William Howard Taft,
vigorously asserted the power of the federal judiciary to protect
interstate commerce from the reach of state law.2 This federal
judicial activism laid bare what Brandeis and Frankfurter knew
well: fights over the boundaries of federal jurisdiction had serious
implications for the allocation of sovereign power between states
and the federal government.3
Since 1938, one head of federal jurisdiction-diversity jurisdic-
tion, as provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 1332 4-seems much removed
from these questions of power. Because of Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, Brandeis's valedictory blow for state sovereignty, federal
judges no longer can use general common-law-making powers to
displace state law.5 Federal judges become instruments of state law,
minus the local bias that taints their state counterparts.
Erie notwithstanding, many lawyers continue to believe that the
choice of forum for state law causes of action matters in ways that
cannot be accounted for by the local bias justification for diversity
jurisdiction.6 In any particular case, federal procedural rules might
favor one side or the other, and practitioners know that procedure
1. Mary Brigid McManamon, Felix Frankfurter: The Architect of "Our Federalism," 27
GA. L. REV. 697, 713 (1993) (quoting a conversation between Brandeis and Frankfurter).
2. See Robert Post, Federalism in the Taft Court Era: Can It Be "Revived"?, 51 DUKE L.J.
1513, 1518-19 (2002).
3. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252, 274 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting); Philip B. Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court and the Erie
Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187, 187 (1957).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000).
5. 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938).
6. THOMAS E. WILLGING & SHANNON R. WHEATMAN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., AN EMPIRICAL
EXAMINATION OF ATTORNEYS' CHOICE OF FORUM IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 13 (2005),
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/ClAct05.pdf/$file/CActO5.pdf.
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can decide cases.7 Personalities of particular judges obviously factor
into the choice as well. In addition, many lawyers share beliefs
about the federal judiciary that go beyond the procedural posture of
particular cases or the reputations of individual judges. Recently,
for example, class action lawyers who represent plaintiffs have
demonstrated a preference for state courts, whereas their adversar-
ies think that federal judges share attitudes that better serve their
clients' interests in complex mass litigation.8
Empirical data necessary to confirm that federal judges share a
set of common motivations is notoriously difficult to gather.9 But the
notion that the members of the federal judiciary share some set of
preferences with respect to particular types of cases is not without
precedent. Burt Neuborne famously postulated that preferences and
predilections shared by federal judges set them apart from state
judges in the way they handle constitutional cases.1 ° If sociological
and psychological phenomena can drive decision making in some
systematic way in constitutional litigation, a shared set of prefer-
ences may possibly drive decision making in diversity litigation as
well.
If federal judges truly differ in some systematic way from their
state counterparts, these collective motivations create federalism
implications for diversity jurisdiction. Particularly when federal
judges systematically favor defendants in categories of disputes for
which state law provides the rule of decision, the federal exercise of
jurisdiction may mean that state law will receive less enforcement
than if cases stay in state court. Diversity jurisdiction then affects
the power of states to regulate the types of conduct that become the
subject of these disputes. The assertion of federal jurisdiction
thereby alters the federalism balance, and does so without a positive
law enacted through the democratic process.
One imperfect measure of shared judicial preferences is the
perception about these preferences held by actors-namely practitio-
7. See, e.g., id. at 22.
8. Id. at 9-10.
9. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal
Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 255-73 (1988).
10. Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1124-27 (1977). For a
contemporary critique of Professor Neuborne's thesis, see generally William B. Rubenstein,
The Myth of Superiority, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 599 (1999).
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ners and legislators-whose opinions on these matters weigh
heavily on the scope and practical effect of federal jurisdiction. Two
important episodes in the history of diversity jurisdiction give
examples of perceptions of shared federal judicial preferences and
how lawyers and lawmakers believed these preferences impacted
decision making in some systematic way. During the first-the
debates over the general common law and diversity jurisdiction
during the decades leading up to Erie-many lawyers believed that
the federal judiciary as a whole harbored procorporate, antireg-
ulatory tendencies that limited the reach of state law."
The second episode involved the debates leading up to the
enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA).'2 CAFA
changed the requirements for diversity jurisdiction for class actions.
Instead of requiring complete diversity, CAFA allows litigants into
federal court if they are minimally diverse, that is, if one class
member hails from a different state than one defendant. 3 Also,
CAFA creates an aggregate amount-in-controversy requirement,
changing the one-time rule for diversity jurisdiction that required
each class member to satisfy 28 U.S.C. § 1332's amount-in-contro-
versy requirment. 4 CAFA supporters hope that this federalization
of multistate class actions will result in fewer certified classes and
thereby relieve defendants of liability for state law causes of
action.' 5 Their faith in the statute rests on what they perceive to be
an emergent hostility in the federal courts toward multistate class
actions that allege state law causes of action.
These two episodes do more than illustrate the idea that shared
judicial preferences may drive decision making in diversity cases.
Striking similarities between the respective debates over the proper
scope of diversity jurisdiction suggest that the interests of corporate
defendants, which federal judges were perceived to have favored
11. See infra notes 79-105 and accompanying text.
12. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
13. 119 Stat. at 9 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A)).
14. Id. (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)). For the pre-CAFA amount-in-controversy rule
for class actions, see Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 300 (1973). After CAFA's
enactment, the Supreme Court allowed supplemental jurisdiction to extend to include claims
by class members that fall short of the amount-in-controversy requirement. See Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2615 (2005).
15. See infra Part III.B.
1252 [Vol. 48:1247
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during the decades before Erie, match the present-day interests that
diversity jurisdiction advances. Moreover, the exercise of jurisdic-
tion in diversity cases furthered and continues to further these
interests in similar ways, by limiting the regulatory reach of state
law.
Finally, the endpoint of the first episode, the Erie decision, offers
both a way to appreciate CAFA's federalism implications and a
basis to criticize the statute. Erie came at the end of an era during
which Progressive lawyers lamented the tendencies of federal
judges to favor certain classes of litigants. The general common law,
in Brandeis's estimation, licensed federal judges in diversity cases
to encroach unconstitutionally on state sovereign prerogatives.' 6 It
gave them a mechanism to turn their preferences into law. Erie, by
destroying this mechanism, took judicial substantive preferences
out of the federalism equation and left the political branches to
decide when and how to displace state rules of decision.
CAFA, in one sense, does the opposite of Erie. It empowers shared
preferences as to the proper scope of class certification in a manner
that supporters hope will weaken the regulatory reach of state law.
In other words, the statute inserts shared judicial preferences into
the federalism equation, albeit indirectly, through a procedural
mechanism. In so doing, it strengthens the nonpolitical branch to
impact the allocation of substantive power between the states and
the federal government.
My discussion proceeds as follows. In Part I, I describe how the
federalism implications of the various heads of jurisdiction differ. I
argue that diversity jurisdiction is unique in the way it impacts
federal-state relations, because it does its work in important part
through federal judges' shared preferences and not through a
positive source of substantive law. In Part II, I situate Erie in
Progressive Era debates over the general common law and diversity
jurisdiction. I argue that Erie's constitutional analysis, viewed
through the lens of this history, expresses that federal judicial
preferences should have little impact on the allocation of substan-
tive power in diversity cases between the states and the federal
government. I turn to CAFA in Part III. After giving background to
16. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938).
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its enactment, I describe congressional debates over the statute and
identify parallels to Progressive Era arguments. Using choice-of-law
decisions as an indicator, I trace the evolution of federal court
discomfort with the cases CAFA targets and argue that this hostility
provided the chief motivation for the statute's expansion of diversity
jurisdiction. CAFA betrays Erie's notion of proper governance. Its
effectiveness is premised on the empowerment of federal judicial
preferences and their interference with the federalism balance in
diversity cases.
I. FEDERALISM AND THE CATEGORIES OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION
The head of jurisdiction under which a case comes to federal
court determines the role the judge, as opposed to Congress or the
President, plays in the allocation of power between states and the
federal government. Although the most notable federalism cases of
the last decade involved federal questions,17 these cases typically
addressed how far Congress or the President could go in displacing
state authority. Of course, the federal judge's role as the umpire has
significant bearing on the limits of congressional or presidential
power vis-a-vis the states. For example, a federal judge might have
to decide whether a federal statute preempts a state cause of action,
or whether the Constitution authorizes Congress to federalize an
area of substantive law. In such instances, however, congressional
intent or the constitutional allocation of power matters. A positive
source of law mediates the judge's task, and so she ultimately plays
a supporting role in the federalism drama that the federal question
creates.
At first blush, habeas jurisdiction seems to move the federal
judge closer to center stage. 18 A petition for a writ of habeas corpus
requires the federal judge to adjudicate a dispute concerning
criminal law and policy, which traditionally has been a preserve of
state sovereignty. 9 Habeas review by a federal district court occurs
17. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 600-01 (2000); Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 902 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551-52 (1995).
18. For a review of federalism issues created by habeas review, see Erwin Chemerinsky,
Thinking About Habeas Corpus, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 748, 762-64 (1986-1987).
19. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief The Federalization of American Criminal
Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1138-39 (1995).
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after multiple levels of a state judiciary have already rejected claims
of constitutional error. The notion that a federal judge should step
into the constitutional breach purportedly neglected by state courts
suggests an untoward indictment of state legal aptitude.2 °
The federal judge's role, however, is again secondary. A positive
source of law, usually the Constitution, tells the federal judge how
to decide a particular petition. In a small minority of habeas cases,
the federal judge decides the constitutionality of a state statute or
rule of criminal procedure.21 Although these cases require the
federal judge to measure state policies by the yardstick of federal
rights, the Constitution provides the rule of decision. Of course,
much of the constitutional law that habeas petitions bring into play
is judge-made.22 But as with federal questions, the judge's role is, in
the end, mediated by a positive instruction, however vague.
The vast majority of habeas petitions, although they might
challenge the quality of justice available in state courts, target no
state policies at all. The petitioner asks the federal court to review
a conviction for procedural errors committed in the trial court. The
state has no policy commitment to the misapplication of constitu-
tional law, and the federal judge takes no interest in the underlying
state substantive or procedural rule.23 The federalism implications
of habeas litigation are usually limited to possible disrespect for
individual state judges' application of federal constitutional law.
Since 1938, cases in federal court pursuant to diversity jurisdic-
tion seem to have little relevance to the federalism balance. The end
Erie brought to the displacement of state common law with
principles of general common law explains why, in Judge Dolores
20. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 n.35 (1976) ("In sum, there is 'no intrinsic
reason why the fact that a man is a federal judge should make him more competent, or
conscientious, or learned with respect to the [consideration of Fourth Amendment claims]
than his neighbor in the state courthouse."' (quoting Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law
and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 509 (1963)) (alteration
in original)).
21. See, e.g., Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 264-65 (2000) (holding constitutional the
California procedure for determining whether a request to withdraw an appeal by an indigent
defendant is frivolous); Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 67, 85 (1987) (declaring the
California mandatory death penalty statute unconstitutional).
22. See Stephen F. Smith, Activism as Restraint: Lessons from Criminal Procedure, 80
TEx. L. REv. 1057, 1068-69 (2002).
23. Admittedly, comity and abstract interests of state autonomy factor into the federalism
equation. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 364 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Sloviter's words from a decade ago, 'little or no attention has
been given to diversity jurisdiction's impact on the principles of
federalism that federal judges must otherwise assiduously follow. 24
Of course, the very grant of diversity jurisdiction is itself a
federalism-tinged insult, since it implies that organs of state
government cannot properly ensure a just proceeding. Since Erie,
however, federal judges, as some derisively put it, merely echo their
state counterparts.25
Judge Sloviter finds the dearth of attention to the federalism
implications of diversity jurisdiction puzzling in light of what she
deems "the unavoidable intrusion of the federal courts in the
lawgiving function of state courts." 6 Federal judges in diversity
cases often must extend existing state law, a task magnified by the
evolution of state supreme courts into certiorari tribunals.27 Judge
Sloviter thinks the federalization of state policymaking through
common law development is particularly problematic because
"judges ... are not selected under the state's system and ... are not
answerable to its constituency."28 Also, federal judges often make
the "wrong" prediction, creating precedent that generates instability
and uncertainty as future federal and state courts try to sort out the
proper rule.29
Although this federalism problem has gone largely unaddressed,
the Supreme Court has at least recognized that it exists. Federal
courts usually must decide diversity cases even if the state rule of
decision is underdeveloped. ° According to the Supreme Court in
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, however, when
a case presents a particularly important question of state policy,
and when the controlling state law is unclear, federal courts must
abstain from deciding.31 The rationale for this abstention lies partly
24. Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens
of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REV. 1671, 1671 (1992).
25. See Sybron Transition Corp. v. Sec. Ins. of Hartford, 258 F.3d 595, 597 (7th Cir. 2001).
26. Sloviter, supra note 24, at 1675.
27. Id. at 1677.
28. Id. at 1687.
29. See id. at 1677-81; see also Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA
L. REV. 651, 709 (1995) (arguing that Erie fails to tell judges "how to ascertain state law").
30. See Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 237 (1943).
31. 360 U.S. 25, 29 (1959); see Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593, 594
(1968) (per curiam); see also Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
1256 [Vol. 48:1247
ERIE, THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT
in the need to prevent "a dubious and tentative forecast" of what
state law is from interfering with policy concerns "intimately
involved with [the state's] sovereign prerogative." 2 As the Court
explained, abstention arises from the need "for the maintenance
of harmonious federal-state relations in a matter close to the
political interests of a State."3 Also, a federal court can avoid wrong
predictions by certifying a question of state law to the appropriate
state supreme court, provided that the supreme court accepts the
certified question."
Diversity jurisdiction can also have implications for federal-state
relations even when the state liability rule at issue is clear. A
particular federal judge may simply dislike one side in a dispute,
and the result might differ from what it would have been had the
case proceeded in state court. The federal summary judgment
standard might privilege a defendant in a certain case, for example,
such that a dispute that might go before a jury in state court never
makes it to trial in federal court.3"
One important set of federalism implications created by diversity
jurisdiction has received less recent attention. When the federal
judiciary as a whole shares preferences or biases in favor of a type
of litigant or against a category of claim, diversity jurisdiction does
not merely affect the outcome of a particular case but alters the
application of state law in a more systematic way. When these
preferences favor defendants, they mean that state law does not get
enforced when it might have had more impact had the case pro-
ceeded in state court. No positive law like the Constitution or a
federal statute mediates the judge's role. The judge alone tips the
federalism balance.
The systematic preferences that create these federalism implica-
tions are slippery, indeterminate, and ephemeral. It is difficult to
800, 814 (1976) (describing the Thibodaux abstention).
32. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 28-29.
33. Id. at 29.
34. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 12.3, at 789-90 (4th ed. 2003). The
Ninth Circuit, for example, will ask for authoritative answers when "state law questions ...
present significant issues, including those with important public policy ramifications."
Kremen v. Cohen, 325 F.3d 1035, 1037 (9th Cir. 2003).
35. JoEllen Lind, "Procedural Swift" Complex Litigation Reform, State Tort Law, and
Democratic Values, 37 AKRON L. REV. 717, 766-70 (2004).
2007] 1257
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prove that they exist, that they influence judicial decision making,
and, if they do, whether they favor one class of litigants or another.
Major policy debates, however, have revolved around the perception
that federal judges' hearts beat in unison with respect to certain
issues. The two episodes I turn to next show how many lawyers
believe that shared judicial inclinations play an important role in
limiting the reach of state substantive law.
II. ERIE AND FEDERALISM
Diversity jurisdiction before 1938 gave rise to perhaps the most
significant federalism concerns of any head of jurisdiction." Under
the Rules of Decision Act, originally adopted as part of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, federal courts must apply "[t]he laws of the several
states" in diversity cases.3" In Swift v. Tyson, with Justice Story
writing for the majority, the Supreme Court ratified the general
understanding that "the laws of the several states" referred to
inherently "local" law,3" or law that addressed "areas of peculiarly
local concern," like real property.39 Throughout the nineteenth
century, federal judges consistently expanded-and arguably
perverted-Swift's mandate to craft a body of general common law
that displaced otherwise applicable state common law in diversity
cases.4 ° On occasion, federal courts even assumed fairly substantial
power to ignore state statutes, as well as otherwise authoritative
interpretations of such statutes from state supreme courts.41
In theory, Erie put an end to this encroachment. With a single
phrase--"[t]here is no federal general common law"-the decision
36. Federal question jurisdiction was not as important before the New Deal, in large
measure due to the dearth of federal statutes. See Henry J. Friendly, Federalism: A Forward,
86 YALE L.J. 1019, 1023-24 (1977); Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the
Administrative State: A Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over Statutory
Interpretation, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 1239, 1254-55 (2002).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000).
38. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 12-13 (1842).
39. See William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1527-28 (1984).
40. See, e.g., EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY
JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958, at 61 (1992) (observing that, by the close
of the nineteenth century, a general common law in the federal courts had displaced state
common law of tort and contract).
41. Id. at 60.
1258 [Vol. 48:1247
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sounded a resounding triumph for state sovereignty by requiring
federal courts to follow the common law forged by their state
brethren.42 To put it in much-abbreviated terms, Erie gave diversity
jurisdiction what courts have subsequently deemed its "sole
purpose": the "protect[ion of] out-of-state defendants from local
bias."43
Erie rests on an enigma. Although Brandeis gave three reasons
for Swift's demise, he insisted that its chief flaw was constitutional.
Brandeis declared that "the unconstitutionality of the course
pursued has now been made clear."" He gave little explanation why
this was so, preferring instead to quote at length from earlier
dissents authored by Justices Holmes and Field.45 The Supreme
Court's post-Erie decisions have done little to clarify why the
Constitution required Swift's demise.4"
One key to Erie's constitutional mystery is the course federal
courts pursued during the Swift Era. Erie emerged from decades of
turbulent debate on the proper role the federal courts should play
in the regulation of interstate commerce. Running throughout these
debates was a perception, shared particularly by Progressive
lawyers, that federal courts favored corporate interests and stood in
the way of state reform efforts.47
42. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Judge Posner pronounced Erie "a
very substantial blow struck for federalism in its modern sense of state autonomy." RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 54 (1985).
43. Schwartz v. Elec. Data Sys., Inc., 913 F.2d 279, 287 n.5 (6th Cir. 1990); see also
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 337 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (describing the
protection of out-of-state litigants from bias as "the theory of diversity jurisdiction").
44. Erie, 304 U.S. at 77-78. Professor Wright labeled the constitutional discussion in Erie
"perplex[ing]." CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 56, at 381 (5th ed. 1994).
45. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78-79.
46. According to Justice Harlan, the Supreme Court in Hanna v. Plumer, its most
significant post-Erie decision, "misconceived the constitutional premises of Erie." 380 U.S.
460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). For summaries of the Supreme Court's post-Erie
contortions, see Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts on the State of Erie After Gasperini, 76 TEX.
L. REV. 1637, 1637-39 (1998), and Allan Ides, The Supreme Court and the Law To Be Applied
in Diversity Cases: A Critical Guide to the Development and Application of the Erie Doctrine
and Related Problems, 163 F.R.D. 19, 19-20 (1995).
47. See, e.g., EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION:
ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA 64 (2000); Melvin I. Urofsky, State Courts and Protective Legislation During the
Progressive Era: A Reevaluation, 72 J. AM. HIST. 63, 63-64 (1985).
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A. The Progressive Era Debate over Diversity Jurisdiction and
Swift
For a topic as seemingly mundane as diversity jurisdiction, it and
Swift attracted a fair amount of heated debate during the decades
after the Civil War and particularly during the Progressive Era.
However agreeably Justice Story's contemporaries accepted Swift in
1842,48 by the turn of the century Progressive lawyers denounced
Swift as a "cancerous growth,"49 an "excrescence n,"" and a "para-
site."" This rhetoric fueled action. Progressives proposed a number
of bills, virtually all unsuccessful, to eliminate or significantly
restrict diversity jurisdiction."2 Brandeis himself initiated one of
these efforts in response to the Supreme Court's notorious decision
in Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co.53 Lawyers for the other side fought back,
labeling diversity jurisdiction's critics "socialists and near socialists"
and suggesting that its elimination would wreak economic havoc in
the country.
54
48. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 34 (1977) (observing that "the
doctrine of the general commercial law was warmly welcomed and expansively construed, not
only by the lower federal courts but by the state courts as well").
49. William M. Meigs, Decisions of the Federal Courts on Questions of State Law, 45 AM.
L. REV. 47, 48 (1911).
50. Id. at 75.
51. Gurney E. Newlin, Proposed Limitations upon Our Federal Courts, 15 A.B.A. J. 401,
404 (1929). Charles Dawson, a federal district court judge, sympathized with "all intelligent
laymen," who "c[ould] not understand why the law should be one thing in a State Court and
something else in the Federal Court." Charles I. Dawson, Conflict of Decisions Between State
and Federal Courts in Kentucky, and the Remedy, 20 KY. L.J. 3,4 (1931).
52. With a single fairly insignificant exception, these attempts failed. See Burford v. Sun
Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 337 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
53. 276 U.S. 518, 519 (1928). A Kentucky company had contracted with a Kentucky
railroad company for exclusive rights to solicit business at its stations. A Kentucky-based
competitor threatened to compete. Knowing that Kentucky law viewed such contracts as
unlawful restraints of trade, the first company reincorporated in Tennessee and filed suit in
federal court. There, it could take advantage of a general common law rule that did not
prohibit the contract. The Supreme Court countenanced the company's blatant forum
shopping by applying the general common law rule. After the decision, Brandeis wrote to
Frankfurter, suggesting that a bill be drafted to abolish the general common law, and
instructed him to give the bill to a particular senator. See PHILIPPA STRUM, LouIs D.
BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 378-79 (1984).
54. See John J. Parker, The Federal Jurisdiction and Recent Attacks upon It, 18 A.B.A.
J. 433, 434 (1932).
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Swift and diversity jurisdiction attracted so much attention
because, in Purcell's words, "[d]iversity jurisdiction symbolized for
both Progressives and their adversaries the de facto alliance
between corporations and the national judiciary."55 The Progressive
assault on Swift is a familiar story, as is the larger context of
Progressive disenchantment with diversity jurisdiction. I summa-
rize the era's debates to stress the important role played by many
lawyers' belief that federal judges shared a systematic bias in favor
of corporate interests and an unfettered national economy. Allusions
to these preferences appear in several of the main debates over
diversity jurisdiction during the Progressive Era, three of which I
describe next. Proponents of diversity jurisdiction insisted, and
opponents disputed, that the federal courts played an essential role
in the protection of out-of-state litigants against local bias. Propo-
nents also claimed that Swift engendered doctrinal uniformity
necessary for the smooth operation of interstate commerce. A third
justification offered for diversity jurisdiction and Swift-that the
federal courts rather than their state counterparts better appreci-
ated that interstate commerce needed to operate freely, without
meddlesome state regulation-also played an important role.
1. Local Bias
Defenders of diversity jurisdiction during the Progressive Era
constantly invoked diversity's foundational rationale that local bias
necessitated federal courts to protect out-of-state litigants from local
bias. The President of the American Bar Association (ABA),5"
writing in 1929, insisted that "[w]hile perhaps the danger of local
prejudices or bias has somewhat abated during the past century, yet
it has by no means disappeared to such an extent that it is a
negligible factor, in present day affairs."57 He chalked up the danger
of prejudice in part to state judges' "desire for re-election."5 " In a
55. PURCELL, supra note 47, at 64.
56. The ABA was known to be staunchly probusiness and opposed to Progressive reform
efforts. See id. at 30, 69. The vehemence with which its members denied any such bias
perhaps reflects this orientation. See Paul Howland, Shall Federal Jurisdiction of
Controversies Between Citizens of Different States Be Preserved?, 18 A.B.A. J. 499, 500 (1932).
57. Newlin, supra note 51, at 403.
58. Id.
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famous 1932 article, John Parker, a Fourth Circuit judge and
staunch advocate for both diversity jurisdiction and the Swift
regime, declared that the bias rationale for diversity jurisdiction "is
as valid today as it was in 1787," due in measurable part to the fact
that "the state trial judge is generally a local man with a local
outlook."59 In 1932 the University of Chicago law faculty opposed
various bills designed to limit or abolish diversity jurisdiction in
part because state judges "are under obligations to the lawyers
appearing before them to a greater extent than federal judges."60
Opponents of diversity jurisdiction scorned the local bias ratio-
nale. Some insisted that any residual local bias disappeared with
technological advances-particularly the advent of "steam and
electricity" 61-and the emergence of a post-Civil War nationalist
spirit. Felix Frankfurter argued in 1928:
Whatever may have been true in the early days of the Union,
when men felt the strong local patriotism of the politically
nouveaux riches, has not the time come now to reconsider how
justifiable the apprehensions, how valid the fears? The Civil
War, the Spanish War, and the World War have profoundly
altered national feeling, and the mobility of modern life has
greatly weakened state attachments.62
Based on an evaluation of affidavits submitted by defendants to
describe local prejudice and to secure a federal forum, Purcell
contends that nineteenth-century corporations had a difficult
time articulating specific incidents of bias.63 He concludes that
59. Parker, supra note 54, at 437. In 1949, Judge Parker wrote an article lamenting the
Erie Doctrine. John J. Parker, Erie v. Tompkins in Retrospect: An Analysis of Its Proper Area
and Limits, 35 A.B.A. J. 19 (1949). He also issued a ringing endorsement of diversity and the
Swift rule from the bench. See Hewlett v. Schadel, 68 F.2d 502, 503-05 (4th Cir. 1934). Judge
Parker found himself enmeshed in another of the twentieth century's great legal disputes
when, in 1951, he authored a majority opinion holding that school segregation did not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment. Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529 (E.D.S.C. 1951), rev'd sub nom.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
60. Members of Chi. Univ. Law Faculty, Comment, Limiting Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts-Pending Bills, 31 MICH. L. REV. 59, 63 (1932).
61. Alfred Russell, Avoidable Causes of Delay and Uncertainty in Our Courts, 25 AM. L.
REV. 776, 795 (1891).
62. Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 521 (1928).
63. In 1867, Congress passed the Local Influence Act, which expanded removal
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proponents of diversity jurisdiction offered the local bias rationale
as a readily available "stock justification."'
As discussed in Part III, local bias, with some empirical evidence
suggesting that it does exist, continues to serve as a modern-day
justification for diversity jurisdiction. Progressives may well have
prematurely declared its demise. Moreover, there may have been
some truth to fears that state courts harbored anticorporate biases,
if not geographical ones.65 Contemporary lawyers sensed that this
was so. As one put it in 1933, "[w]hatever prejudice there may be
against the foreign corporation is probably not geographical but
economic in its nature. It is a popular dislike of the foreign corpora-
tion, not because it is foreign, but because it is a corporation."66
Similarly, then-Judge Taft, in an 1895 speech, argued that diversity
jurisdiction was a necessary antidote to "the deep-seated prejudice"
local courts harbored against national business interests.67 In 1922,
Taft, by this time Chief Justice, insisted that diversity jurisdiction
and impartial federal courts were essential factors in the develop-
ment of the "newer parts" of the country, because they gave
investors confidence in the mechanism for legal redress.6"
2. Uniformity
Defenders of diversity jurisdiction also lauded it and Swift for
the doctrinal uniformity they engendered. 69 A 1906 corporate law
treatise declared:
jurisdiction but required the intended beneficiaries of the statute to show, by way of affidavit,
bias against them in state tribunals. Analyzing decisions that commented on such filings,
Purcell concluded that corporate defendants found it hard to tell a compelling story of
prejudice. PURCELL, supra note 40, at 129.
64. Id.
65. See TONY FREYER, HARMONY AND DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT AND ERIE CASES IN
AMERICAN FEDERALISM 109 (1981); Tony A. Freyer, The Federal Courts, Localism, and the
National Economy, 1865-1900, 53 BUs. HIST. REv. 343, 344-45 (1979).
66. George W. Ball, Revision of Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 28 ILL. L. REV. 356, 361
(1933) (footnote omitted).
67. William H. Taft, Criticisms of the Federal Judiciary, 29 AM. L. REV. 641,650-51 (1895).
68. William H. Taft, At the Cradle of Its Greatness, 8 A.B.A. J. 333, 335 (1922).
69. See Alton B. Parker, The Common Law Jurisdiction of the United States Courts, 17
YALE L.J. 1, 10 (1907). For a post-Erie version of this argument, see Arthur John Keeffe et al.,
Weary Erie, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 494, 504 (1949).
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Without the power to assert the common law of the United
States or the power to assert the law upon the basis of reason of
universal application throughout the United States, there could
be no real union, and the existence of a court with the power to
assert such law is inseparable from existence as a nation.70
As one federal judge argued in 1932, "[w]hatever may be thought of
the reasoning of Mr. Justice Story in Swift v. Tyson, the result
arising from it is of great practical importance in standardizing the
law of the federal courts, thus enabling them to do justice between
citizens of different states. 1
Certainly the Progressives were not opposed to the idea of a
uniform law.72 But they doubted that Swift's defenders sought
uniformity for uniformity's sake. Swift's defenders tended to have
in mind a particular goal for uniformity. Interstate commerce
required uniformity; national industries needed to be able to predict
how the law would apply should they find themselves in court in
some faraway state. Justice Clifford, an early expositor of this
rationale, wrote in an 1880 concurrence that, "[s]hould this court
adopt a principle of decision which ... would establish as many
different rules for the determination of commercial controversies as
there are States in the Union, it would justly be considered a public
calamity. '73 Later, Judge Parker argued that Swift and a uniform
common law were essential for "the free development of trade and
commerce ... so that the citizen who trades, or travels, or makes
investments, in states other than that of his residence, may know
with substantial certainty what his rights and liabilities in a given
situation will be. 74
Considerations of political economy aside, a legion of contempo-
rary commentators attacked the uniformity rationale as a specious
70. FRANK HENDRICK, THE POWER To REGULATE CORPORATIONS AND COMMERCE: A
DISCUSSION OF THE EXISTENCE, BASIS, NATURE, AND SCOPE OF THE COMMON LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 445 (1906).
71. Cent. Vt. Ry. Co. v. S. New Eng. R. Corp., 1 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (D. Mass. 1932).
72. Many Progressives supported the uniform law movement, for example. See William
Graebner, Federalism in the Progressive Era: A Structural Interpretation of Reform, 64 J. AM.
HIST. 331, 332 (1977).
73. R.R. Co. v. Nat'l Bank, 102 U.S. 14,58 (1880) (Clifford, J., concurring in the judgment);
see William R. Casto, The Erie Doctrine and the Structure of Constitutional Revolutions, 62
TUL. L. REV. 907, 914-17 (1988).
74. Hewlett v. Schadel, 68 F.2d 502, 504 (4th Cir. 1934).
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and demonstrably baseless excuse.7'5 As Judge Friendly, who studied
with Frankfurter at Harvard and clerked for Brandeis, explained
several decades later, the Supreme Court could not ensure substan-
tive unity in the legal doctrine that affected interstate commerce.
State statutes trumped the general common law, and Swift's writ
did not extend, at least formally, to statutory law.76 Also, the growth
of judicial activity in the nineteenth century and the growing
importance of federal question jurisdiction to the Supreme Court's
docket prevented diversity jurisdiction from playing this role.77
3. Business and Diversity Jurisdiction
A third justification-the federal courts better appreciated the
needs of an interstate economy-reveals diversity jurisdiction's
federalism implications. This rationale's appearance in the era's
debates, and the Progressive reaction to it, suggest that, at the very
least, lawyers of the day believed that systematic procorporate,
antiregulatory preferences influenced federal judges' decisions in
diversity cases.
In his 1932 defense of Swift, Judge Parker argued that diversity
jurisdiction played an essential role in the creation of a national
economy:
No power exercised under the Constitution has, in my judgment,
had greater influence in welding these United States into a
single nation; nothing has done more to foster interstate
commerce and communication and the uninterrupted flow of
capital for investment into the various parts of the Union; and
75. See, e.g., Ball, supra note 66, at 362; Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Business of the Supreme
Court at the October Terms, 1937 and 1938,53 HARv. L. REv. 579, 607(1940); Benno Schmidt,
Substantive Law Applied by the Federal Courts-Effect of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 16 TEX. L.
REv. 512,517 (1938); Harry Shulman, Comment, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson, 47 YALE L.J.
1336, 1348 (1938).
76. Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 383, 405-06 (1964).
77. Id. For an example of a Progressive Era commentator who urged that Story's goal
could be preserved if the Supreme Court played a more active role in the supervision of the
common law, see Henry Schofield, Swift v. Tyson: Uniformity of Judge-made State Law in
State and Federal Courts, 4 ILL. L. REV. 533, 537-39, 548 (1910).
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nothing has been so potent in sustaining the public credit and
the sanctity of private contracts.78
Judge Parker echoed a claim made in 1922 by Justice Taft, who
applauded the federal courts' appreciation of business needs: "No
single element in our governmental system has done so much to
secure capital for the legitimate development of enterprises
throughout the West and South as the existence of federal courts
there, with a jurisdiction to hear diverse citizenship cases. 79 In
Judge Parker's mind, federal courts were so essential to the
economic health of the country that, if Progressives succeeded in
their efforts to restrict diversity jurisdiction, their campaign could
worsen the Great Depression: "It certainly seems to me that this
time of financial distress is not a propitious one for the passage of
laws which will frighten capital out of states which stand so badly
in need of it."'
Justice Taft's and Judge Parker's faith in the federal courts as
engines of economic development rested on a venerable assumption
that these judges appreciated that they had a certain role to play as
guarantors of a national free market.81 In an article he wrote for
Felix Frankfurter's seminar at Harvard on the federal courts,
Henry Friendly argued that Congress in 1789 crafted diversity
jurisdiction to protect out-of-state creditors against debtor-friendly
state courts.8 2 Later John Frank agreed, arguing that the founders
created diversity jurisdiction to enable commercial interests to liti-
gate cases before judges more "firmly tied to their own interests."83
78. Parker, supra note 54, at 437.
79. Id. at 439 (quoting a speech given by William H. Taft to the ABA in 1922).
80. Id.
81. See Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCIA L.
REV. 1353, 1398-404 (2006). But see C. Douglas Floyd, The Inadequacy of the Interstate
Commerce Justification for the Class Action Fairness Act, 55 EMORY L.J. 487, 499-507 (2006)
(arguing that diversity jurisdiction was not intended to have an overtly commercial purpose).
82. Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483,
496-97 (1928); see also FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE
SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 9 (1928) (arguing that diversity
jurisdiction was created to provide merchant classes with acceptable fora).
83. John P. Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 3, 28 (1948).
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As evidenced by Swift, Justice Story was perhaps the nineteenth
century's greatest proponent of this role for federal judges. Story
intended that the federal courts would serve as expositors of a
national commercial law and thereby help immunize the national
economy from provincial regulation. 4 Nineteenth-century corpora-
tions exhibited an overwhelming preference for federal fora during
the decades after the Civil War, indicating that Story successfully
influenced federal courts' perceptions of themselves.8 5 In a 1933
article, Dean Charles Clark observed that corporations were either
the plaintiff or defendant in three-fourths of federal cases for which
state law provided the rule of decision."6 A survey of thirteen federal
districts reported that eighty-seven percent of cases removed to
federal court in 1929 and 1930 involved a corporate litigant.8 7 Other
data suggest that corporations succeeded significantly more
frequently in federal court as compared to state court.88
As Purcell explained, litigation in federal court favored corporate
interests for a number of reasons, only one of which was the sub-
stance of the general common law. Federal courts were often much
further away than local county courts for individual litigants,
increasing expenses and compelling early and cheap settlements.8 9
Also, local plaintiffs' lawyers were less familiar with litigation in
federal fora than their corporate defense counterparts. 9° The mere
existence of the general common law helped corporations too,
because they could often argue for one of two possible rules of
decision to apply when cases proceeded in federal court.91
84. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780-1860, at 250
(1977). Professor Horwitz argues that federal courts imposed a uniform commercial law "on
unwilling state courts." Id. Others argue that Justice Story captured the era's prevailing
understanding of the commercial law and the federal courts' proper role as expositors. See
generally Charles A. Heckman, The Relationship of Swift v. Tyson to the Status of Commercial
Law in the Nineteenth Century and the Federal System, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 246, 249 (1973)
(arguing that Justice Story's approach to the general common law coincided with that of
contemporary commentators).
85. PURCELL, supra note 40, at 21.
86. Charles E. Clark, Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 19 A.B.A.
J. 499, 502 (1933).
87. Id.
88. PURCELL, supra note 40, at 22.
89. Id. at 45-46.
90. Id. at 54.
91. Id. at 63-64.
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The substance of the corporate-friendly general common law
played an important supporting role.92 In the early nineteenth
century, state and federal courts alike applied the same general law
in certain classes of cases.93 Indeed, Justice Story would have found
alien the notion that there existed a "federal" general common law
as distinct from state common law. The distinction was between
general law, about which federal judges in diversity cases could
exercise independent judgment, and local law.94 By the turn of the
century, however, federal courts had expanded Swift's mandate far
beyond its original boundaries. They took license to ignore state tort
and contract law,95 a particularly important power in light of the
increasingly corporate-friendly general common law.96 In several
famous diversity cases, the Supreme Court ignored authoritative
state interpretations of state constitutions and even refused to apply
state statutes. 97 Most notoriously, in some 250 cases, the Supreme
Court held that the general common law trumped statutes agrarian
states had enacted to protect local debtors against Eastern-owned
railroad creditors,9 provoking resentment in state courts.99 In
92. Id. In a 1908 campaign speech, William Howard Taft gave an illustrative example of
the interaction among the several factors Purcell identified:
A non-resident railway corporation had removed the case which had been
brought in the local court of the county in which the injured employee lived, to
the Federal court, held, it may be, at a town forty or one hundred miles away.
To this place at great expense the plaintiff was obliged to carry his witnesses.
The case came on for trial, the evidence was produced and under the strict
Federal rule as to contributory negligence or as to non-liability for the negligence
of fellow servants, the judge was obliged to direct the jury to return a verdict for
the defendant. Then the plaintiffs lawyer had to explain to him that if he had
been able to remain in the State court, a different rule of liability of the company
would have obtained, and he would have recovered a verdict.
William Howard Taft, The Delays of the Law, 18 YALE L.J. 28, 37 (1908).
93. Fletcher, supra note 39, at 1519.
94. Id.; see also PURCELL, supra note 40, at 59-60.
95. See PURCELL, supra note 40, at 61.
96. Id.
97. See Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175, 175-76 (1863) (refusing to apply
a state statute that set aside debts owed to railroads); Rowan v. Runnels, 46 U.S. (5 How.)
134, 139 (1847) (refusing to follow a Mississippi Supreme Court interpretation of a slavery
clause in the Mississippi state constitution). Federal courts did not ignore positive sources of
state law particularly frequently. See WRIGHT, supra note 44, § 54, at 371.
98. See Alan F. Westin, Populism and the Supreme Court, in YEARBOOK 1980, at 62,62-63,
67 (Supreme Court Historical Soc'y ed., 1980); see also Freyer, supra note 65, at 347, 350
(putting the figure at three hundred cases).
99. The Iowa Supreme Court issued an indignant federalist response to the Gelpcke
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1895, then-Judge Taft, a tireless supporter of diversity jurisdiction
throughout this era, observed that "[t]he capital invested in great
enterprises in the South and West is owned in the East or abroad"
and praised the federal courts for protecting the sanctity of these
investments from local courts, which served "a corporation-hating
community."'00
Certainly the Supreme Court's stewardship of the general
common law explains some of this development as a path-dependent
phenomenon. By the turn of the century, however, the Supreme
Court's burgeoning federal question docket limited its ability to
supervise the general common law as carefully.'10 Without a positive
law or authoritative precedent requiring lower federal courts to act
in a certain way, the exercise of lawmaking powers from the bench
to favor systematically corporate interests indicates that shared
preferences drove decision making.
These procorporate tendencies may well have been the side effect
of a common legal philosophy that privileged stasis over creative
evolution to meet newly arisen social needs.102 Also, commentators
dispute whether procorporate tendencies, either overt or indirect,
existed at all.'03 As Progressive Era debates over Swift and diversity
jurisdiction indicate, however, many lawyers of the day clearly
believed federal judges were so motivated." 4 Regardless of the
decision, insisting that it "launched [the country] upon the stormy sea of judicial conflict
between State and federal courts." McClure v. Owen, 26 Iowa 243, 258 (1868).
100. William Howard Taft, Criticisms of the Federal Judiciary, 29 AM. L. REV. 641,650-51
(1895).
101. See Cole v. Pa. R. Co., 43 F.2d 953, 957-57 (2d Cir. 1930).
102. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 288 (3d ed. 2005); GRANT
GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 62-63 (1977); PURCELL, supra note 47, at 13; Karl N.
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How
Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 396 (1950).
103. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. Ross, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR
UNIONS CONFRONTTHE COURTS 1890-1937, at 16 (1994). But see WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, COURT
AND CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE NEW LEGALITY 1932-1968, at 3 (1970);
David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of
Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 7-8 (2003). See generally Paul Kens,
Dawn of the Conservative Era, 1997 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 1 (surveying and analyzing the laissez-
faire era).
104. Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The
Lesson ofLochner, 76 N.Y.U. L.REv. 1383,1420-28 (2001) (discussing"overwhelming [turn-of-
the-century] commentary that outright accused judges of importing their [laissez-faire and
class] biases in to the law").
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origins of the procorporate bias, and regardless of whether it was
conscious or subconscious, lawyers believed that it affected decision
making.105
Progressives' sensitivity to federal judicial activism in favor of
corporate interests reflected their political objectives and prefer-
ences, which often included the empowerment of state regulation of
commerce, a distaste for unchecked corporate power, and an
inclination for the legislative over the judicial branch. Progressives
were committed federalists who often pursued economic regulation
at the state level,' where, not incidentally, they had their greatest
success.' ° Brandeis, for example, preached a consistent federalist
message that favored states over the federal government. 10 8 Political
institutions worked best when they responded to the will of the
people,"°9 and the diversity of conditions in a place as large as the
105. Many reform-minded lawyers, including Brandeis, thought that judges shared a
laissez-faire, social Darwinist ideology that interfered with efforts to achieve progressive legal
change. Brandeis claimed that, up until the chief justiceship of Edward White,
[c]ourts continued to ignore newly arisen social needs. They applied
complacently 18th century conceptions of the liberty of the individual and of the
sacredness of private property. Early 19th century scientific half-truths like
'The survival of the fittest," which translated into practice meant 'The devil
take the hindmost," were erected by judicial sanction into a moral law.
Louis D. Brandeis, The Living Law, 10 ILL. L. REV. 461, 464 (1916). Felix Frankfurter,
Brandeis's prot~g6, in 1916 denounced the Brewer/Peckham Courts as a period "in which the
prevailing philosophy was naturally enough laissez-faire." Editorial, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 5,
1916, reprinted in FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT: EXTRAJUDICIAL ESSAYS ON
THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 43, 44 (Philip B. Kurland ed., 1970). Brandeis continued
to worry that the federal courts let systematic bias in favor of corporate interests influence
decisions upon his appointment to the Court in 1916. PURCELL, supra note 47, at 119.
Certainly, an archconservative reaction under Chief Justice Taft, and his procorporate
approach to the general common law, did nothing to dispel this concern. Post, supra note 2,
at 1592-93.
106. Graebner, supra note 72, at 332 (observing that Progressives favored uniform state
legislation instead of federal legislation); id. at 348 (observing that Progressives shared a
"consensus ... on the virtue of federalism"). Given the inefficacy of state-level solutions to
large-scale national problems, Progressives at times favored national regulation at the federal
level. See, ?.g., Theodore M. Davis, Jr., Note, Corporate Privileges for the Public Benefit: The
Progressive Federal Incorporation Movement and the Modern Regulatory State, 77 VA. L. REV.
603, 622-25 (1991).
107. Melvin I. Urofsky, Myth and Reality. The Supreme Court and Protective Legislation
in the Progressive Era, in YEARBOOK 1983, at 53, 56 (Supreme Court Historical Soc'y ed.,
1983).
108. David W. Levy, Brandeis and the Progressive Movement, in BRANDEIS AND AMERICA
110 (Nelson L. Dawson ed., 1989).
109. PHILIPPA STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PROGRESSIVISM 76 (1993).
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United States made the local and diverse exercise of governmental
power important.1 ' Hence, Brandeis maintained strong support for
state regulatory efforts as social experiments that tracked the needs
of citizenry."'
Brandeis's distaste for large-scale corporate enterprise also
illustrates an important strain of the Progressive philosophy of
political economy." 2 Brandeis labeled corporations "Frankenstein
monster[s]," 13 responsible in large measure for the onset of the
Great Depression." 4 He believed that the soul-crushing control they
exercised over the lives of their workers undermined democratic
citizenship."5 According to one of his biographers, Brandeis saw the
role of the judiciary as assisting the government to rein in large
corporations and to restore economic organization to the small scale
it would have operated on but for the monopolistic and plutocratic
practices of large corporations and the politicians who helped
them."6 He believed that the elite bench and bar enjoyed a cozy
relationship with corporations that prevented them from helping
"the people.""1
7
Progressives also demonstrated a preference for legislation over
judicial fiat. Barry Friedman observed that, "[a]t the height of
the Populist/Progressive era, the sine qua non of democracy was
110. Brandeis made clear his preference for small government, as responsive to diverse
conditions nationwide, in his first dissent. See N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147,
169 (1917) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
111. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,311(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
STEPHEN W. BASKERVILLE, OF LAWS AND LIMITATIONS: AN INTELLECTUAL PORTRAIT OF LOUIS
DEMBITZ BRANDEIS 259-60, 305 (1994); STRUM, supra note 109, at 84.
112. See Melvin I. Urofsky, Proposed Federal Incorporation in the Progressive Era, 26 AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. 160, 162 (1982).
113. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 567 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting in part).
114. Id. at 566-67; see also New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 306-07 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(noting that "[tihe people of the United States are now confronted with an emergency more
serious than war," and that "[m]ost of them realize that failure to distribute widely the profits
of industry has been a prime cause of our present plight").
115. See Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389, 410 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); Louis Brandeis, Big Business and Industrial Liberty, reprinted in THE CURSE OF
BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 38, 38-39 (Osmond K. Fraenkel ed.,
1935); Louis Brandeis, True Americanism, reprinted in BRANDEIS ON DEMOCRACY 28 (Philippa
Strum ed., 1995).
116. STRUM, supra note 109, at 88.
117. Louis Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law, reprinted in BRANDEIS ON DEMOCRACY,
supra note 115, at 57.
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responsiveness to popular preference.""' As Purcell explained, "[t]he
legislative branch was popularly elected and hence closer to the
people, and it had the authority to investigate social problems
methodically and ameliorate them broadly."'19 Brandeis's emphasis
on judicial restraint as courts considered the constitutionality of
legislation exemplifies this orientation. 2 ° So too does Progressive
distaste for aggressive judicial review, which was viewed as anti-
democratic.' 2 '
With tools like preemption and substantive due process in their
arsenal, federal courts hampered many state legislative projects,
much to Progressive frustration.'22 Insofar as the common law in the
absence of a comprehensive statutory regime played a significant
role in economic regulation, 2 ' federal court displacement of state
common law with a more corporate-friendly general common law
also stirred Progressive resentment. 1
24
The belief that federal courts ruled-and formulated rules-
systematically in favor of corporate interests was a constant theme
in the campaign Progressives waged against diversity jurisdiction
and Swift. The Democratic Party's 1896 platform accused federal
judges of "becom[ing] at once legislators, judges and executioners,"
"in contempt of the laws of the States and rights of citizens."'25 A
speaker at an 1891 ABA convention declared that, because of
118. Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law's
Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971, 1002 (2000).
119. PURCELL, supra note 47, at 13; see also id. at 165-66 (noting that "Brandeis viewed the
courts as obstacles to reform and the legislature, however imperfect, as the means of
achieving it").
120. Melvin I. Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis: Advocate Before and on the Bench, 30 J. SUP. CT.
HIST. 31, 38 (2005).
121. See, e.g., William Trickett, The Great Usurpation, 40 AM. L. REV. 356, 376 (1906).
122. See Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the
States, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 495 (1997).
123. See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV.
1189, 1192 (1986) (observing that tort law represented the primary means of regulation during
the late nineteenth century).
124. See Gardbaum, supra note 122, at 495; Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 81, at 1406;
see also Armistead M. Dobie, Seven Implications of Swift v. Tyson, 16 VA. L. REV. 225, 228
(1930).
125. Democratic Platform of 1896, reprinted in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 1840-1960, at
97, 99 (Kirk H. Porter & Donald Bruce Johnson eds., 1961). A trio of decisions on the Sherman
Antitrust Act, the federal income tax, and the imprisonment of Eugene Debs-none having
to do with Swift or diversity jurisdiction---can claim significant credit for this position. See
Friedman, supra note 104, at 1392-93; Westin, supra note 98, at 68-69.
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diversity jurisdiction and the tendencies of federal judges to favor
corporate interests, citizens "have smarted under the impression
that the general government was a hostile and unfriendly govern-
ment, not having the good of the people at heart." '126 A North
Carolina state judge derided federal judges "as truly beyond the will
of the people as the Czar of all the Russias" and advocated for
popular judicial elections.' 7 Roscoe Pound in 1906 denounced
diversity jurisdiction and the Swift regime as central culprits to
blame for the rise of popular discontent with the judiciary.'28 In
1933, Dean Clark argued that the systematic preference of corpora-
tions for federal fora "d[id] not add to the prestige of the federal
judicial establishment."'29 Later, Frankfurter insisted that corporate
abuse of diversity jurisdiction, which reached its zenith during the
Progressive Era, demonstrated diversity jurisdiction's fundamental
unworthiness. 3 ° Even Taft admitted in 1895 that "[t]he constant
struggle of most corporations to avoid State tribunals ... and to
secure a Federal forum ... is chiefly the cause for the popular
impression in those States that the Federal courts are the friends of
corporations and the protectors of their abuses.""'
The general common law attracted a great deal of attention from
Progressive lawyers who believed that federal judges shaped it
consciously to aid corporations. Then-Solicitor General Robert
Jackson, in a 1938 article praising Erie, argued that "[p]erhaps the
chief beneficiaries of the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson were corporations
doing business in a number of states. '' 32 A reform-minded professor
insisted that 'Mr. Justice Story and his colleagues must bear a
heavy share of the blame for the hatred of federal courts entertained
by so many citizens of the United States."'' 3 In 1908, Taft, hardly a
Progressive, admitted that the general common law had contributed
126. Alfred Russell, Avoidable Causes of Delay and Uncertainty in Our Courts, 25 AM. L.
REv. 776, 795 (1891).
127. Walter Clark, The Revision of the Constitution of the United States, 32 AM. L. REV. 1,
8(1898).
128. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 46 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 54, 62-63 (1962).
129. Clark, supra note 86, at 503.
130. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 55 (1954) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
131. Taft, supra note 100, at 652.
132. Robert H. Jackson, The Rise and Fall of Swift v. Tyson, 24 A.B.A. J. 609, 613 (1938).
133. Dobie, supra note 124, at 240.
127320071
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
to the popular impression that federal judges systematically favored
corporations:
How could a litigant thus defeated [by a general common law
rule less favorable than a state counterpart], after incurring the
heavy expenses incident to litigation in the Federal court, with
nothing to show for it, have any other feeling than that the
Federal courts were instruments of injustice and not justice, and
that they were organized to defend corporations and not to help
the poor to their rights?'
Thus, both defenders and opponents of Swift and diversity
jurisdiction believed that the federal courts existed to facilitate
commerce, served as preserves of corporate power, and developed
the general common law to help protect the operation of interstate
commerce unencumbered by state laws. 3 ' No positive source of law
required federal judges to act as bulwarks against state interfer-
ence. The perception that they had shouldered this responsibility
may evidence shared preferences and their systematic influence
on decision making. Corporate-friendly general common law rules,
crafted by judges perceived to have had policy biases with no roots
in democratically enacted positive law, displaced state-created
common law. This phenomenon unmasked these judges as central
actors in the federalism drama.
B. Erie's Constitutional Spirit
When Brandeis declared in Erie that "the unconstitutionality of
the course pursued has now been made clear,"'36 he quite likely had
in mind the expansion of the general common law, the perception of
a corporate-friendly judiciary, and their impact on state sovereignty
as the "course pursued" under Swift. Brandeis was a Progressive
lawyer par excellence: he had helped lead the Progressive assault
on Swift and diversity jurisdiction, and he espoused many of the
Progressive beliefs about judges' biases.'37 The constitutional nail
134. Taft, supra note 92, at 37.
135. PURCELL, supra note 40, at 25, 61, 251.
136. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938).
137. See PURCELL, supra note 47, at 143; Brandeis, supra note 105, at 464.
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Erie hammered into Swift's coffin responds neatly to Progressive
concerns about the reach and exercise of federal judicial power.
Brandeis gave three reasons why Swift v. Tyson had to go. The
first-that Justice Story erred in his interpretation of the Rules of
Decision Act-found support in the "recent research of a competent
scholar," Charles Warren.'38 For his second reason, Brandeis
weighed Swift's "defects, political and social," against the benefits
that general common-law-making powers had failed to achieve.'39
By the early twentieth century, Swift no longer delivered the
promised doctrinal uniformity in the common law. Concomitantly,
the regime it licensed resulted in discrimination against in-state
litigants, who were denied "equal protection of the law" when their
cases were removed to federal court by out-of-state litigants. 4 '
Brandeis stressed the importance of his third reason-Swift's
unconstitutional interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act-with
the acknowledgement that the social and political defects he
identified alone would not compel the Court "to abandon a doctrine
so widely applied throughout nearly a century."'' The threat Swift
created to state sovereignty became clear as federal judges took the
jurisgenerative powers Swift provided and crafted a corporate-
friendly general common law that displaced state law. The resulting
harm was the "course" Brandeis believed to be constitutionally
unacceptable. But why did this lived experience unveil a constitu-
tional problem?
Erie delivered its constitutional blow to the general common law
in two sentences:
Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common
law applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature
or "general," be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts.
138. Erie, 304 U.S. at 72-73. Warren claimed that an earlier draft of the 1789 Act made
clear that federal courts were supposed to apply state common law in diversity cases. See
Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L.
REv. 49, 84-88 (1923). His interpretation of the earlier draft likely was incorrect. See Fletcher,
supra note 39, at 1514-15; Friendly, supra note 76, at 389-90.
139. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74.
140. Id. at 74-75.
141. Id. at 77.
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And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a
power upon the federal courts.
142
As these twin observations suggest, Erie's constitutional footing
stands in an understanding of the proper balance between states
and the federal government, with a separation of powers overlay.143
Federalism lies at Erie's heart, but the question of what constitu-
tional garb Brandeis's federalism wore is disputed. Brandeis
complained that Swift licensed the federal courts to "invade [] rights
which ... are reserved by the Constitution to the several States.
144
Under the Tenth Amendment, powers not given to the federal
government are "reserved to the States."1 45 Richard Freer asserts
that "everyone seems to agree that the holding is based upon the
Tenth Amendment.1 146 A number of commentators concur.
1 47
The Tenth Amendment, however, is an imperfect candidate. Two
years before Erie, the Supreme Court had rendered the Tenth
Amendment largely powerless to limit the federal government's
displacement of state substantive authority.' 41 Moreover, Brandeis
quoted at length from an 1893 dissent by Justice Field, which
expressly relied on the Tenth Amendment to establish Swift's
142. Id. at 78.
143. At least one scholar has cited to Brandeis's lament that Swift frustrated the "equal
protection of the law," id. at 74-75, as evidence that he rooted the decision in the Fifth
Amendment. See John R. Leathers, Erie and Its Progeny as Choice of Law Cases, 11 HOUS.
L. REV. 791, 795-96 (1974). It is highly doubtful that Brandeis had the Fifth Amendment in
mind in 1938. The Supreme Court would not read equal protection into the Fifth Amendment
until 1954. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth
of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 713 n.114 (1974).
144. Erie, 304 U.S. at 80; see also Donald L. Doernberg, Juridical Chameleons in the "New
Erie" Canal, 1990 UTAH L. REV. 759, 764 ("It appears that the Erie Court intended generally
to prevent the federal courts from making substantive policy decisions that the Constitution
left to the states."); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 13 (1985) (describing federalism as "the key principle invoked in Erie").
145. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
146. RICHARD D. FREER, INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL PROCEDURE § 10.4, at 467 (2006).
147. See, e.g., George D. Brown, Of Activism and Erie-The Implication Doctrine's
Implications for the Nature and Role of the Federal Courts, 69 IOWA L. REV. 617, 621 (1984);
Ides, supra note 46, at 27.
148. See United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 183-84 (1936).
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constitutional defects. '49 With this blueprint available, Brandeis's
decision not to cite to the amendment seems quite deliberate. 5 °
Brandeis's silence speaks volumes. Swift failed its constitutional
test not because the general common law violated a textual
provision of the Constitution, but because the Constitution did not
give the federal courts the sort of general common-law-making
powers they had exercised in the decades leading up to Erie. John
Hart Ely insists that "the lack of a relevant provision was
precisely the point.""'5 The federal courts' interpretation of the Rules
of Decision Act "was unconstitutional because nothing in the
Constitution provided the central government with a general
lawmaking authority of the sort the Court had been exercising
under Swift.' 5 2 "As the general structure of the Constitution"-not
just the Tenth Amendment-requires, the federal government is a
government of limited powers. Because the Constitution does not
explicitly give instruments of the federal government the power to
craft substantive common law, they may not do so.153 Erie's empha-
sis on the negative-Congress "has no power" to create a general
common law, "[a]nd no clause in the Constitution purports to confer
such a power" on the courts-underscores Professor Ely's interpreta-
tion.'54
149. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368 (1893), was an 1893 tort case
that concerned the fellow servant rule, an old common law doctrine that prevented an
employee from holding his or her employer liable for the negligence of a fellow employee. In
response to the majority's displacement of a state common law rule with a principle of general
common law, Justice Field declared that "[t]he law of the State on many subjects is found only
in the decisions of its courts, and when ascertained and relating to a subject within the
authority of the State to regulate, it is equally operative as if embodied in a statute." Id. at
397 (Field, J., dissenting). The dissent is something of an Erie urtext. Anticipating Brandeis's
terse declaration, Field insisted that "[tihere is no unwritten general or common law of the
United States on the subject." Id. at 394. He explicitly identified the Tenth Amendment as the
textual provision that prohibits Swift's regime, id. at 399, and argued that "[slupervision over
either the legislative or the judicial action of the States is in no case permissible except as to
matters by the Constitution specially authorized or delegated to the United States." Id. at
401. "Any interference with either," Field reasoned, "is an invasion of the authority of the
State and, to that extent, a denial of its independence." Id.
150. See PURCELL, supra note 47, at 178-80.
151. Ely, supra note 143, at 702.
152. Id. at 703.
153. Merrill, supra note 144, at 13-14 (explaining this principle and concluding that "any
assertion by the judiciary of a general power to make law would encroach upon the powers
reserved to the states").
154. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
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This interpretation of the general common law's federalism
affront clarifies why it took a "course pursued" before Swift's
constitutional pockmarks were "made clear." '155 In 1842 the reliance
on a general common law rule of decision in a commercial case did
not injure state sovereignty. Such matters were understood to be
general and as such not particularly within the 'local" concern of
states. In short, the division between the general common law and
local law neatly matched the division between federal and state
prerogatives. The general common law's expansion, and with it
increased interference with the application of state law, made
manifest a serious federalism problem.
Federalism, however, is only half of the Erie equation. Separation
of powers and Erie's emphasis on legislative primacy place another
important check on federal courts' lawmaking powers. Erie's
constitutional analysis begins, "[e]xcept in matters governed by the
Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied
... is the law of the State."'56 Congress can displace state law when
authorized to do so by the Constitution,157 but even when Congress
has this power, the federal courts may not exercise it. Put differ-
ently, even if Congress may displace a state rule of decision, the
federal courts may not do so of their own accord, because they lack
this lawmaking power.'58
Erie's reliance on the separation-of-powers doctrine reflects a
number of Progressive values, including deference to legislatures
and a fervent belief in democratic participation as a source of
legitimacy. Congress's power to legislate in areas traditionally
governed by state common law is now quite expansive. This state of
affairs makes Erie's separation of powers all the more important as
a present-day check on federal courts' jurisgenerative powers and
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Although Brandeis insisted that "Congress has no power to declare substantive rules
of common law applicable in a State ... be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts,"
id., this statement is certainly no longer true, as the Interstate Commerce Clause, invigorated
only three years after Erie, makes certain. See generally United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941). Indeed, as Paul Mishkin has argued, the evolution of the Interstate Commerce Clause
may have rendered Brandeis's statement incorrect even in 1938. Paul J. Mishkin, Some
Further Last Words on Erie-The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1682, 1684 n.10 (1974).
158. See Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1, 11-12 (1975) (stating that Erie "recognizes that federal judicial power to displace state law
is not coextensive with the scope of dormant congressional power").
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their temptation to trespass onto territory left for state govern-
ments.'59 Here lies the tidy intersection between the federalism and
separation-of-powers halves of Erie's constitutional equation. With
an invigorated federal power to displace state law at the ready,
what keeps federal courts from working a federalism injury to states
by crafting a usurpative general common law is their institutional
incompetence to do so. As Professor Mishkin argued, Erie reflects
the belief, widely held among Progressives and frustrated by Swift
run rampant, "that courts are inappropriate makers of law intrud-
ing upon the states' views of social policy in the areas of state
competence."'"
Erie came at the end of an era during which Progressives and
their adversaries waged a hard-fought battle over the proper scope
of federal judicial power as exercised in diversity cases. The "course
pursued" under Swift led federal courts to usurp both state and
congressional power. The product of this usurpation-the general
common law-was authored by a judiciary that many believed
shared a procorporate bias that interfered with state regulatory
efforts.' 6 ' Erie rendered judicial preferences much less relevant to
the federalism balance of power by denying federal courts common-
law-making powers. Also, by framing its attack on Swift in terms of
a "course pursued," Erie expressed an opinion on proper governance
in a federalist political system. The political branches, with their
particular expertise and, more importantly, their accountability to
an electorate, could legitimately encroach on state regulatory
prerogatives.'62 Federal judges, with no such structural mechanisms
159. See Peter Westen, Comment, After"Life for Erie"--A Reply, 78 MICH. L. REv. 971,973
(1980) ("Since there are so few limits on what is decided, the real limits, if any, must be on
who decides.").
160. Mishkin, supra note 157, at 1686-87.
161. See supra Part II.A.3.
162. Herbert Wechsler and Henry Hart adopted Erie as their own in the subsequent
decades. See Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688,694 (1989) (reviewing PAUL
M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (3d
ed. 1988)) (giving April 25, 1938, when the Supreme Court decided Erie, as the birthdate of
the legal process school). They did not believe any federalism limitations on Congress's power
were needed. For them, the fealties legislators owed to their constituents and their states
would exercise an effective check-Wechsler's "Political Safeguards of Federalism"-on
Congress's temptation to flex its muscle at states' expense. See generally Herbert Wechsler,
The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and
Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). See also Bradford R.
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in place to ensure that their preferences did not interfere inappro-
priately with state sovereignty, could not.
III. THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT AND DIVERSITY
JURISDICTION'S CONTINUED FEDERALISM IMPLICATIONS
If viewed as an attempt to take shared judicial policy preferences
out of the federalism equation, Erie's success is mixed. Eighty years
later, many lawyers continue to believe that, all else held equal,
substantive outcomes differ depending on which sovereign decides
the dispute due to judges' collective inclinations.16 CAFA has its
origins in these beliefs.
CAFA expands diversity jurisdiction to give defendants the option
to require that most significant class actions with members from
more than one state proceed in federal court."6 Its supporters
believe that the statute will result in fewer certified classes. This
result would mean fewer settlements and verdicts in plaintiffs'
favor, which in turn would limit the regulatory reach of the sorts of
state laws often enforced by way of class actions. Most states' class
action procedures are quite similar to Rule 23,65 so the differences
in applicable procedural law cannot account for supporters' confi-
dence. Recent amendments to Rule 23 certainly favor defendants,
1 66
as do recent Supreme Court decisions,1 6 but these also insufficiently
explain why supporters pursued federalization.6
8
Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1419 (2001)
(discussing Erie and the political safeguards of federalism). For recent discussions of
Wechsler's theory, see John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV.
1311, 1315 (1997), and Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political
Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000).
163. THOMAS E. WILLGING & SHANNON R. WHEATMAN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ATTORNEY
REPORTS ON THE IMPACT OF AMCHEM AND ORTIZ ON CHOICE OF A FEDERAL OR STATE FORUM IN
CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: A REPORTTO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES REGARDING
A CASE-BASED SURVEY OF ATTORNEYS 8 (Apr. 2004).
164. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4, 119 Stat. 4, 9 (2005).
165. Roger H. Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELLL. REV.
779, 786 & n.34 (1985).
166. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).
167. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625-28 (1997).
168. A recent Federal Judicial Center study reported that Amchem and Ortiz had no
measurable impact on lawyers' decisions to prosecute class actions in federal versus state
courts. See WILLGING & WHEATMAN, supra note 163, at 4.
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A dramatic change in federal courts' receptivity to the most
important types of state law class actions-mass tort and consumer
protection cases brought on behalf of class members from multiple
states-explains why CAFA came into existence when it did, and
why federalization might prove an effective way to limit the
regulatory reach of state law for a category of cases. Since the mid-
1990s, federal courts have demonstrated a systematic impatience
with the aggressive use of Rule 23 in multistate cases with state law
causes of action.' 9 This hostility, which is traceable through federal
courts' choice-of-law decisions, does not directly result from a formal
change in the law but instead appears to reflect an emerging
consensus against certain uses of the class action device. CAFA
supporters' confidence in federalization rests in large measure on a
perception of this shared hostility.
Class actions are an important mechanism for the enforcement of
various kinds of state law. CAFA's expansion of diversity jurisdic-
tion for multistate class actions brings shared judicial inclinations
to bear significantly on the regulatory reach of this law. In other
words, though Erie tried to neutralize judicial biases, CAFA
consciously injects policy preferences into the federalism equation.
Striking similarities between the debates over CAFA and pre-Erie
debates over diversity jurisdiction suggest that the statute's
supporters expect CAFA to function in a manner not dissimilar from
the general common law: it is an avenue through which federal
judges' shared preferences can limit the regulatory reach of state
law, at least for a small but important subset of claims typically
brought as class actions. Although CAFA does not bear Swift's
precise constitutional flaws, it contradicts Erie's message regarding
proper governance in a federalist system, particularly the decision's
emphasis on the separation of powers as a federalism safeguard.
After describing the background to CAFA, I trace these similarities
to show how CAFA creates some of the federalism implications Erie
intended to minimize.
169. See infra notes 314-18 and accompanying text.
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A. Background to CAFA
1. The Rise and Fall of the Multistate Class Action in Federal
Court
State law class actions, particularly multistate mass tort and
products liability cases, have stirred particularly heated controversy
since the beginning of Rule 23's modern period in 1966.17° That year,
the Advisory Committee singled out mass torts and similar cases as
ill-suited for class treatment. 7 ' Not long afterwards, however,
federal courts began to accept the propriety of such multistate
classes.'72 In 1991, Judith Resnik observed that "most agree that
aggregate processing-in some forum-and aggregate treatment of
some mass torts in federal courts are essential,"'73 and the debate
du jour was not whether to certify these sorts of cases "but what if
any limits to impose" on Rule 23.1" Indeed, some proposed that
mass tort class actions be consolidated in the federal courts; the
defense bar's opposition to legislation to this effect suggests that
federal courts were hospitable climes for these cases.175
The solutions federal courts offered to one of the more vexing
problems posed by multistate class actions underscore the nature
of the equilibrium reached by the early 1990s. Choice of law in
multistate damages class actions is an extremely important hinge
170. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (Advisory Committee Notes to 1966 amendments). Charles Alan
Wright, one of the members of the Advisory Committee responsible for the 1966 amendments
to Rule 23, originally stated that mass torts should be excluded entirely from Rule 23(b)(3).
He later seemed to change his mind, in large measure due to the costly and repetitive nature
of modern day mass torts. Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation," 54 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 5, 17 n.53 (1991). Professor Wright later backed away from any wholesale embrace of
class certification of mass torts. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 n.19 (5th Cir.
1996) (quoting letter from Charles Alan Wright).
171. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (Advisory Committee Notes to 1966 amendments, subdiv. (b)(3)).
172. Arthur R. Miller, Comment, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth,
Reality, and the "Class Action Problem,"92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 679-80 (1979).
173. Resnik, supra note 170, at 21.
174. Id. at 45.
175. See Robert W. Kastenmeier & Charles Gardner Geyh, The Case in Support of
Legislation Facilitating the Consolidation of Mass-accident Litigation: A View from the
Legislature, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 535, 535-36 (1990); Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort Litigation and
the Dilemma of Federalization, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 755, 786-87 (1995). For the defense bar's
reaction to this proposed legislation, see Charles Gardner Geyh, Complex-litigation Reform
and the Legislative Process, 10 REV. LITIG. 401, 410 (1991).
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on which certification often turns.17 6 In a mass tort, product liability,
or consumer protection lawsuit, the judge must decide which state's
substantive law to apply to each class member's claim. If the judge
concludes that the law of each class member's home state applies,
class certification raises serious concerns of commonality,177 pre-
dominance, 178 and superiority.1 79 For example, if a different state's
law applies to each class member's claim, how can a judge give a
jury a sensible liability instruction? In such a case, individual
proceedings may seem more manageable and thus superior to a
single gargantuan proceeding.
Federal and state courts have addressed the choice-of-law
difficulty in several ways. Some courts have chosen a single state's
law to apply to all class members' claims, usually the law of the
defendant's principal place of business or the law of the state
where a product was manufactured or designed. ' ° Other courts
recognize that they can decertify a class at a later stage in the
litigation if the case proves unmanageable, and they grant certifica-
tion and postpone choice of law.181 Pragmatic judges know that
certification may encourage settlement, so they may ignore
predominance or superiority problems under the assumption that
cases will never reach the summary judgment motion or trial
phase."2 Third, courts have grouped class members into manage-
able subclasses according to similarities among various states'
laws.8 3 Finally, at least in the past, courts have granted certifica-
tion notwithstanding the applicability of multiple states' laws on the
176. See Barbara Ann Atwood, The Choice-of-law Dilemma in Mass Tort Litigation: Kicking
Around Erie, Klaxon, and Van Dusen, 19 CONN. L. REv. 9, 38-40 (1986); Russell J. Weintraub,
Choice of Law as an Impediment to Certifying a National Class Action, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 893,
894-95 (2005); Ryan Patrick Phair, Comment, Resolving the "Choice-of-law Problem" in Rule
23(b)(3) Nationwide Class Actions, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 835, 835 (2000).
177. E.g., Lichoff v. CSX Transp., Inc., 218 F.R.D. 564, 574 (N.D. Ohio 2003).
178. E.g., Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 626-27 (5th Cir. 1999).
179. E.g., In re Baycol Prods. Litig., 218 F.R.D. 197, 209 (D. Minn. 2003).
180. E.g., Simon v. Philip Morris Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 46, 78 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); In re
Kirschner Med. Corp. Sec. Litig., 139 F.R.D. 74, 84 (D. Md. 1991).
181. E.g., Steinberg v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 224 F.R.D. 67, 78 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
182. See, e.g., Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 427 (4th Cir. 2003); In re
Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1009 (3d Cir. 1986); Georgene M. Vairo, Georgine, the
Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, and the Rhetoric of Mass Tort Claims Resolution, 31 LoY. L.A.
L. REv. 79, 115 (1997) ("A primary purpose of class certification, however, is to facilitate the
aggregated resolution of a mass tort through settlement.").
183. E.g., O'Keefe v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 214 F.R.D. 266, 291 n.19 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
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assumption that there are few differences among states' liability
rules.'
Employing such techniques of case management, several federal
circuits in the 1980s upheld class certification notwithstanding
seemingly insuperable choice-of-law obstacles. In the Agent Orange
case, the Second Circuit affirmed Judge Weinstein's certification of
a nationwide mass exposure class, in spite of the likelihood that
New York's choice-of-law rules would lead to the application of
fifty states' tort laws in a single proceeding. The court noted that
common questions of law, most notably the availability of a certain
federal common law defense, predominated to such an extent that
its resolution in a single proceeding would bring about an efficient
conclusion to the litigation; the court also intimated, however, that
Judge Weinstein had stretched Rule 23 to its breaking point.8 5
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in the Bendectin case rejected the
defendants' argument that every state's tort law should apply and
upheld the certification of a nationwide class alleging products-
liability claims. Because the tortious conduct occurred where the
defendants manufactured the drug in question, the court held that
"the law of the state of manufacture of the product [was] more
significant in this type of case than that of the state where an
individual plaintiff happens to live."'86 Consistent with Bendectin,
a draft proposal from the American Law Institute in 1993 recom-
mended that mass torts could best be treated as class cases in a
single forum under a single substantive rule."8 7
Perhaps in response to the aggressive use of Rule 23 in the 1980s
and 1990s, the pendulum swung in the opposite direction in the
mid-1990s. Again, the treatment of choice of law proved a central
battleground. The Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits in the mid-
1990s-with decisions one prominent plaintiffs' lawyer deemed an
"unholy trinity"'-expressed unmistakable skepticism to the
184. E.g., Wadleigh v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 410, 419 (N.D. Ill. 1994), rev'd
sub. nom. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F. 3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). For a discussion of
ways by which federal judges resolved the choice of law problem, see Atwood, supra note 176,
at 27-33.
185. In re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 725 F.2d 858, 860-61 (2d Cir. 1984).
186. In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 305 (6th Cir. 1988).
187. See AM. LAWINST., COMPLEXLITIGATION PROJECT § 6.01 cmt. a, at 398 (Proposed Final
Draft Apr. 5, 1993).
188. Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Life After Amchem: The Class Struggle Continues, 31 LOY. L.A.
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notion that choice of law problems in multistate class actions
are surmountable. In In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., the Seventh
Circuit issued a writ of mandamus to decertify a class composed of
persons with hemophilia who had allegedly contracted HIV through
tainted blood treatment products." 9 The district court reasoned
that differences among the fifty states' tort laws were sufficiently
negligible such that a single case aggregating claims of a nationwide
class could proceed in a manageable fashion. The Seventh Circuit
vacated this decision with thinly veiled hostility. Citing Erie, it
skewered the district court's choice of law agnosticism with
impatience: if the defendants' liability did not hinge on "the precise
way in which a state formulates its standard of negligence .... [,] one
begins to wonder why this country bothers with different state legal
systems.""9
The Fifth Circuit in Castano v. American Tobacco Co. relied on
Rhone-Poulenc to decertify a nationwide class of smokers alleging
negligence claims against the tobacco industry.'9 ' The district court
had postponed the choice-of-law decision.'92 The Fifth Circuit held
that this postponement was improper,' and further "f[ound] it
difficult to fathom how common issues could predominate [under
Rule 23(b)(3)] when variations in state law are thoroughly con-
sidered."'94 The Fifth Circuit also invoked Georgine v. Amchem
Products, Inc., an asbestos decision in which the Third Circuit
decertified a settlement class in significant part because the choice-
of-law calculus meant that individual issues predominated over
common ones.
195
As discussed further below, this trio of cases heralded a seismic
shift in federal judicial attitudes toward the propriety of multistate
classes."9 Guided by choice of law and by other emerging difficul-
L. REv. 373, 375 (1998).
189. 51 F.3d 1293, 1304 (7th Cir. 1995).
190. Id. at 1301.
191. 84 F.3d 734, 741-42 (5th Cir. 1996).
192. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544, 554 (E.D. La. 1995).
193. Castano, 84 F.3d at 741.
194. Id. at 742 n.15.
195. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 627, 630 (3d Cir. 1996).
196. See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-total Demise of the
Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REv. 373, 385-88 (2005).
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ties, plaintiffs' lawyers began to abandon federal courts for state
fora. 197 This shift proved instrumental to the genesis of CAFA.
2. Regulatory Reform and CAFA
Federal courts' growing hostility to the aggressive use of Rule 23
in multistate cases with state law causes of action provided the
soil for CAFA's germination. To understand why supporters found
federalization attractive, it helps to consider whose interests these
class actions impact.
Lawyers and commentators have long recognized that class
actions play significant roles as instruments of economic regu-
lation.19 In the absence of an invigorated administrative apparatus
in the United States, class action litigation shoulders a particularly
large share of regulatory responsibilities.'99 As the Supreme Court
has declared, "[t]he aggregation of individual claims in the context
of a classwide suit is an evolutionary response to the existence of
injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of government."2" The
debates leading up to CAFA's passage confirm the importance of
class actions as mechanisms for regulation through the enforcement
of state law. Some of the law's principal proponents identified the
supposed illegitimacy of large-scale economic regulation through
private litigation based on state law causes of action as a chief
rationale for the statute.2 °'
197. Cabraser, supra note 188, at 386 ("It is no secret that class actions-formerly the
province of federal diversity jurisdiction-are being brought increasingly in the state courts.");
Paul D. RhFingold, Prospects for Managing Mass Tort Litigation in the State Courts, 31 SETON
HALL L. REV. 910, 910 (2001).
198. Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit,
8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 687 (1941) (recognizing the potential for class actions to serve as
complements to administrative regulation); see also Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role
for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 94-95 (2003).
199. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959) ("The
obligation to pay compensation [through an award of damages] can be, indeed is designed to
be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy."); Richard A. Nagareda,
Administering Adequacy in Class Representation, 82 TEx. L. REV. 287, 350 (2003); Edward F.
Sherman, Consumer Class Actions: Who Are the Real Winners?, 56 ME. L. REV. 223, 236
(2004).
200. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980).
201. See Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, State Farm v. Avery: State Court Regulation
Through Litigation Has Gone Too Far, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1215, 1215-16 (2001).
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In light of the economics and vagaries of litigation, class certifica-
tion is often the crucial event on which a case's trajectory turns.
Settlement dynamics illustrate class certification's central impor-
tance as a litigation event.2°2 The prospect of a class trial on behalf
of every victim of an industrial accident or a poorly designed drug,
rather than individual cases, each with idiosyncratic evidentiary
difficulties, may significantly ratchet up the settlement pressure on
a defendant.20 3 Conversely, denial of class certification may well
force plaintiffs facing the prospect of a small recovery to lower their
settlement threshold or even abandon their claims altogether.2 4
The empowerment of the multistate class action in federal court
in the 1980s meant that underlying state law had more regulatory
bite. At the same time, conservative policymakers initiated an
antiregulatory backlash, targeting in particular state law that
they believed had a deleterious effect on the operation of inter-
state commerce.20 5 One prominent Reagan Administration lawyer
remarked in 1983 that regulatory relief was a "cornerstone of" the
administration's economic policy, and that fundamental change to
the American product liability system through the federalization of
substantive law was a critical element in this reform.0 6 Perhaps
unsuspectingly paying homage to Judge Parker and other defenders
of the early twentieth-century general common law regime, this
lawyer insisted that "[t]he wide differences in state laws ... make it
practically impossible for manufacturers of products sold throughout
the United States to determine the standards of conduct to which
they will be held. 20 7
One attempt at substantive change came to fruition in 1996,
when the Contract With America Congress passed the Common
202. THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS
IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
RULES 10 (1996) (observing that "a substantial majority of certified class actions" settle); see
also Douglas E. Abrams, The Place of Procedural Control in Determining Who May Sue or Be
Sued: Lessons in Statutory Interpretation From Civil RICO and Sedima, 38 VAND. L. REV.
1477, 1532-33 (1985).
203. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995).
204. Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1275-76 (11th Cir. 2004).
205. See TIMOTHY CONLAN, FROM NEW FEDERALISM TO DEVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS
OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM 296, 313-14 (1998).
206. C. Boyden Gray, Regulation and Federalism, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 93, 96 (1983).
207. Id. at 97.
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Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act (PLLRA).2°" The bill
would have placed strict limits on punitive damages available to
plaintiffs, °9 ended strict liability for product sellers,2 10 and expressly
preempted state law to the contrary.21' Business interests lobbied
heavily for the bill, which they believed would greatly restrict the
reach of state product liability laws.212 With Brandeisian rhetoric,
President Clinton vetoed the bill, reasoning that "the States should
have, as they always have had, primary responsibility for tort law.
The States traditionally have handled this job well, serving as
laboratories for new ideas and making needed reforms.""2 3
The idea for CAFA formed about the time that the product
liability law failed, 4 and the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits had
staked out their hostile positions on multistate class actions. CAFA
was the brainchild of a group of Fortune 100 corporate counsel
named the Civil Justice Reform Group (CJRG).1 5 The CJRG's
mission is to try to address what its members believe to be a civil
justice system that has spiraled out of control.21 '6 The CJRG
considered various proposals, including caps on damages and other
fundamental changes to the American tort system, before settling
on what it believed to be a more politically palatable idea.2"7 The
group drafted CAFA, found Congressional support, and spent
between $50 and $200 million lobbying for its enactment.1 8
208. Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996, H.R. 956, 104th Cong. (2d
Sess. 1996).
209. Id. § 108(b).
210. Id. § 103(a).
211. Id. § 102(b).
212. See Cynthia C. Lebow, Federalism and Federal Product Liability Reform: A Warning
Not Heeded, 64 TENN. L. REv. 665, 672 (1997) (noting that "[t]he Congressional findings
preceding the statutory language of the PLLRA ... [t]o a large extent ... echoed the complaints
of the business community").
213. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING His VETO OF
H.R. 956, A BILL To ESTABLISH LEGAL STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES FOR PRODUCT LIABILITY
LITIGATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, H.R. Doc. No. 104-207, at 1 (1996).
214. For a suggestion that tort reformers turned to procedural remedies after the failure
of substantive tort reform in the mid- 1990s, see Lind, supra note 35, at 728-29.
215. Sue Reisinger, Ms. Rabiteau Goes to Washington, CORP. COUNS., June 2005, at 82.
216. Id. at 83.
217. Id. at 82-83.
218. Id. at 82.
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Despite substantial backing from the business community,219
CAFA, which Senator Herb Kohl introduced in the Senate in
1997,220 did not pass until February 2005. A version had passed the
House in 2003 but did not survive a Democratic filibuster in the
Senate.22' Perhaps emboldened by their successes at the polls in
2004, Republican senators were able to push the bill through shortly
after the election.
3. CAFA
CAFA has several main provisions.222 The first substantive sec-
tion, entitled in part "Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights,"
requires that attorneys' fees in settlements in which class members
get coupons must depend on the value of coupons actually re-
deemed, as opposed to the face value of coupons distributed.223 This
provision is designed to prevent plaintiffs' attorneys from colluding
with defendants to craft settlements that are quite large in nominal
terms, thereby supporting a large award of fees, but really cost very
little because few class members actually redeem their coupons.224
Second, CAFA requires defendants who have agreed to propose
settlements of class actions to serve a copy of the proposed settle-
ment agreement on designated state and federal officials. '
CAFA's heart is its third substantive section. The statute gives
the federal courts original jurisdiction over every class action with
an aggregate amount in controversy that exceeds $5 million, when
at least one class member comes from a different state than at least
one defendant.22 This provision is designed to correct what CAFA
219. See PUB. CITIZEN, UNFAIRNESS INCORPORATED: THE CORPORATE CAMPAIGN AGAINST
CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS 28 (2003), available at http://www.citizen.orgldocuments/
ACF2B13.pdf (charting the number of corporate lobbyists that lobbied for a federal class
action statute in the years prior to CAFA's enactment).
220. See 143 CONG. REC. S897 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1997) (statement of Sen. Kohl).
221. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Class-action Legislation Fails in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23,
2003, at A23.
222. For a section-by-section analysis of CAFA, see Sarah S. Vance, A Primer on the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1617 (2006).
223. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 1712(a), 119 Stat. 4, 6 (2005).
224. For a short discussion of coupon settlement issues, see DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL.,
CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 488-89 (2000).
225. Class Action Fairness Act § 1715(b), 119 Stat. at 7.
226. Id. § 4(a)(2), 119 Stat. at 9.
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supporters believe to be two defects in diversity jurisdiction. The
first was occasioned by the Supreme Court's requirement of
complete diversity under the general diversity statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332,227 and the second stemmed from the Court's (one-time)
refusal to extend supplemental jurisdiction to cover class members'
claims that did not meet § 1332's amount-in-controversy require-
ment.228 CAFA also expands removal jurisdiction by making any
case that meets these criteria a candidate for removal.229 In effect,
CAFA gives defendants in any substantial multistate class action a
federal forum option.
Most multistate class actions with the requisite amount in
controversy will come within the mandatory jurisdiction of the
federal courts. For some class actions, this jurisdiction is discretion-
ary. A federal court may apply a set of factors provided for in the
statute and decline to exercise jurisdiction over a class action where
more than one-third and fewer than two-thirds of class members
come from one state.3 ° The legislative history, however, makes clear
that federal courts are supposed to do so very reluctantly.31 Also,
the federal courts shall decline to exercise jurisdiction over cases
where more than two-thirds of class members are from a single
state, provided that at least one defendant, whose alleged conduct
is a significant part of the lawsuit, is a citizen of the state.232
B. Rationales for CAFA
In 1979 Arthur Miller declared that "much of the controversy
[over class actions] has been highly emotional, often focusing on
particular events in individual cases that have been transmogrified
over the years into cosmic anecdotes. 233 The heated debate over
CAFA, with many irrelevant arguments made by both sides, gave
this observation contemporary resonance. Medical malpractice
227. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806).
228. Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973), overruled by Exxon Mobil Co. v.
Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2615 (2005); see supra note 14 (discussing Zahn and
Allapattah).
229. Class Action Fairness Act § 5, 119 Stat. at 12-13.
230. Id. § 4(a)(3), 119 Stat. at 9-10.
231. 151 CONG. REC. H723, 728 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
232. Class Action Fairness Act § 4(a)(4), 119 Stat. at 10.
233. Miller, supra note 172, at 664-65.
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abuse,234 the very existence of representative litigation,"' and even
the supposed deleterious impact of class actions on "our veterans"
were some of the non sequiturs supporters bandied about under
the Capitol dome during the debates leading up to the statute's
passage.236 Opponents responded with the specter of Enron, a
financial disaster that, because it triggered mostly federal causes of
action, would have fallen outside CAFA's intended scope.237
Through this rhetorical morass several chief justifications for the
law emerged. A principal argument-that CAFA would protect
consumers and other prospective class members against predatory
plaintiffs' lawyers238-is beyond the scope of this article. Given its
tenuous empirical basis, it likely provided political cover but was
not a chief motivation for supporters.239 Three other justifications
234. In one floor debate Senator Voinovich complained about medical malpractice abuse,
a type of litigation that rarely proceeds in class form. 151 CONG. REC. S1241 (daily ed. Feb.
10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Voinovich). Senator Frist similarly used CAFA as a jumping-off
point for a general, broad-based attack on the American tort system. See 151 CONG. REC. S996
(daily ed. Feb. 7, 2005) (statement of Sen. Frist).
235. One of the chief lobbyists for CAFA said the following in testimony before a Senate
subcommittee: "If I told you that the House had just passed a new bill that would allow
lawyers to bring lawsuits without first obtaining permission from the parties on whose behalf
the lawsuit supposedly was being brought, you presumably would be shocked." The Class
Action Fairness Act of 1999: Hearing on S. 353 Before the S. Subcomm. on Administrative
Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 126-27 (1999)
[hereinafter Hearing] (prepared statement of John H. Beisner, Esq., O'Melveny & Myers LLP,
Washington, D.C.). Another lobbyist observed that,
in the class actions we are seeing today, class members are the forgotten
participants. No one checks to see if the putative class members really want to
have their claims asserted in a class action. No one asks the class members how
or where they wish their claims to be asserted. No one confers with class
members to find out if they wish to have their claims litigated.
Id. at 111 (statement of Stephen G. Morrison, Gen. Counsel, Policy Management Systems
Corp.). This feature of class actions-that lawyers can bring cases without the participation
of absent class members-is an essential feature of aggregate litigation and is the basis for
the notice and opt-out requirements of Rule 23(c).
236. 151 CONG. REC. H686 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 2005) (statement of Rep. Davis).
237. E.g., 149 CONG. REC. S 12876 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy). For
a discussion of some of these causes of action, see In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA
Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 563, 568-613 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
238. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2, 119 Stat. 4, 4-5 (2005);
NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Class Actions (PBS television broadcast Feb. 11, 2005), available
at http://www.pbs.org/newshourlbb/congress/jan-june05/lawsuits_2-11.html.
239. The notion that federal courts do a better job than state courts in policing settlements
to make sure that plaintiffs' lawyers do not take advantage of their clients lacks empirical
support. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorneys Fees in Class Action
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quite closely track arguments supporters of diversity jurisdiction
and the general common law made in favor of powerful federal
courts during the Progressive Era. Local bias and uniformity
resurfaced as rationales for CAFA. Most importantly, supporters
stressed that federal courts somehow better appreciate the needs of
interstate commerce to operate without unnecessary regulation.
This last justification hints at an important role played by shared
judicial preferences with regard to class actions.
1. Local Bias
Progressive lawyers insisted in the first decades of the twentieth
century that technological advances and nationalism had undercut
the local bias rationale for diversity jurisdiction. Reports of the
demise of local bias continue to the present.24 ° Nonetheless, debates
over CAFA demonstrate the continuing vitality of the local bias
justification.
As was the case with local bias in the Progressive Era, empirical
evidence attesting to or debunking the existence of local bias is
scant. Studies of attorneys' perceptions-the best extant empirical
data available-lead to mixed conclusions. A 1992 study reported
that twenty-seven percent of plaintiffs' lawyers surveyed declared
that local bias against the defendant motivated state courts,
whereas fifty-one percent of their colleagues in the defense bar did
the same.241 Another study concluded that perceptions of bias vary
Settlements: An Empirical Study, 1 J. EMPERICAL LEGAL STUD. 27 (2004) (manuscript at 23,
on file with authors). Moreover, virtually every major nonprofit consumer organization in the
United States opposed CAFA. See 149 CONG. REC. S12880-81 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 2003)
(statement of Sen. Leahy) (listing organizations). The CAFA Senate Report referenced a 1999
RAND study as its empirical support for its claim. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 53 (2005). The
study actually concludes that "there is no empirical basis for assessing the arguments that
... federal judges generally manage damage class actions better than state judges." DEBORAH
HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 28 (1999). The Senate Report's misuse of the RAND study has spawned
continued misrepresentation of the empirical robustness of this claim. See, e.g., Warren W.
Harris & Erin Glenn Busby, Highlights of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 72 DEF.
COUNS. J. 278 (2005).
240. See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 39-40 (1990).
241. Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under Diversity
and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 408-09 (1992).
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depending on the location, with attorneys who practice in rural
areas believing that it continues to play a role.242
Whether real or imagined, local bias fairly frequently spurred
arguments in CAFA debates. As its backers claimed, out-of-state
defendants in class actions need expansive diversity jurisdiction to
protect them from "be[ing] home-towned by local judges and
juries. 243 Federal courts would be a bulwark against "home cook-
ing, '244 and a shield against corrupt local judges whose election
coffers are filled by the local plaintiffs' bar.245 The findings section
of the statute declares "that State and local courts are ... sometimes
acting in ways that demonstrate bias against out-of-State defen-
dants. 2 46
Many of CAFA's backers put a finer point on this local bias
argument. They claimed that trial courts in certain states-the so-
called "magnet" jurisdictions in particular counties in Illinois,
Texas, Alabama, and Mississippi-were beholden to local lawyers,
had spun out of control, and would certify meritless classes to coerce
extortionate settlements.247  The odd frequency with which
multistate class actions found their ways to certain isolated counties
suggests that there may be something to the magnet jurisdiction
claim.24
242. See Kristin Bumiler, Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases: Analysis of a Survey and
Implications for Reform, 15 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 749, 752-60, 772 (1980-81); see also Debra Lyn
Bassett, The Hidden Bias in Diversity Jurisdiction, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 119, 136-40 (2003).
243. 148 CONG. REC. H842 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 2002) (statement of Rep. Cox).
244. 151 CONG. REC. S1229, 1230 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham).
245. E.g., Hearing, supra note 235, at 97 (statement of E. Donald Elliott, Prof. of Law, Yale
Law School) ("Many out-of-state defense lawyers have had the experience of arriving at a
state courthouse, only to see their opponent drive up in a car bearing a campaign sticker from
the judge's last election."); 149 CONG. REC. S12954 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 2003) (statement of Sen.
Sessions) ("[Class actions] would be better in a more objective tribunal of Federal court where
judges have lifetime appointments. They are not so tied to the plaintiff lawyer who may go to
church with them or have contributed to their campaign .... That is just a fact.").
246. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(4)(A)-(B), 119 Stat. 4-5
(2005).
247. E.g., 149 CONG. REC. S12994 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 2003) (statement of Sen. Chambliss)
("To a great extent, the bulk of the tort reform-that is needed in this country needs to be
handled at the State level.... However, as the tort system now stands, there are about a
handful of State court jurisdictions in the United States where a tremendously
disproportionate number of class action lawsuits are filed.").
248. John H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, They're Making a Federal Case Out of It
... in State Court, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 143, 159 (2001).
20071 1293
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
CAFA supporters identified Avery v. State Farm Mutual Auto
Insurance Co., 249 pursued in Madison County, Illinois, as the
emblematic abusive class action brought in a magnet jurisdiction. °
There, a trial court certified a nationwide class under Illinois law,
in spite of the fact that most other states' laws did not support the
plaintiffs' theory of liability.251 The Illinois Supreme Court ulti-
mately reversed the certification decision, so Avery is not a great
example of a single county court exercising unchecked power over
nationwide conduct. The application of the uniquely restrictive
Illinois law to the whole country, however, does illustrate the
potentially abusive power one remote county court could exercise.
States' responses to magnet jurisdictions in their midst illustrate
the questionable need for a federal solution to class action abuse at
the state level. The willingness of Madison County courts to certify
classes appears to be fairly limited.253 Moreover, the Avery decision
highlights the fact that, even if a faraway trial court may abuse the
class certification process, state appellate courts remain a potent
check on abuse.254 CAFA supporters attacked an Alabama practice
known as "drive-by" certification, whereby plaintiffs would file a
motion for class certification with the complaint and get a decision
before the defendant had a chance to file a responsive pleading.
25
The Alabama Supreme Court put an end to these drive-by certifica-
tions in 1997.256 Backers complained of laxity by state courts in
Jefferson County, Texas, 5 7 but state legislation passed in 2003
allows for interlocutory appeals of class certification orders to an
appellate judiciary perceived as hostile to class actions. 255 The worst
horror story of class action abuse came from a county in Mississippi,
where plaintiffs repeatedly joined a local pharmacy owner as a
249. 835 N.E.2d 801 (Ill. 2005).
250. E.g., 151 CONG. REC. H685, 687 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 2005) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte).
251. Avery, 835 N.E.2d at 813-14 (describing class certification order).
252. Id. at 824.
253. See 151 CONG. REC. S1239 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Clinton); 149
CONG. REC. S12881 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 2003) (statement of Sen. Durbin).
254. Avery, 835 N.E.2d at 824. For precisely this observation, see James E. Pfander, Avery
Raises Doubts About the Class Action Fairness Act, 93 ILL. B.J. 648, 649 (2005).
255. See 151 CONG. REC. H689 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 2005) (statement of Rep. Keller); PUB.
CITIZEN, CLASS ACTION "JUDICIAL HELLHOLES": EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE Is LACKING 6 (2005).
256. PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 255, at 6.
257. See 151 CONG. REC. $1177, 1179 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
258. PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 255, at 8.
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defendant to frustrate removal and stay before friendly state
judges." 9 Mississippi in 2004 changed its venue and joinder rules to
prevent this sort of harmful gamesmanship.2' °
As was the case during the Progressive Era, some speculate that
a different sort of bias, if bias exists, fuels defendants' desire to get
into federal court. As Judge Friendly observed in 1973, if a state
judge is prejudiced in favor of the plaintiff, it is likely because the
defendant is a corporation, not because the defendant has its
headquarters or principal place of business in another state. 6 A
1980 study of lawyers' perceptions of bias lends support to this
argument.262 The converse of this suggestion is that the federal
courts, not state judges, harbor a preference that runs in the
opposite direction, in favor of corporate defendants.
2. Uniformity
CAFA's backers took a page from their turn-of-the-century
forbears, arguing that the federalization of class actions is necessary
to provide uniform standards for the regulation of interstate
commerce. As Walter Dellinger, whose law firm played a significant
role in the bill's passage, put it in his Congressional testimony,
"[c]lass actions squarely implicate the Framers' concern with
preserving national standards for regulating and protecting
interstate commerce through the exercise of diversity jurisdic-
tion. 263
CAFA backers did not explain how, without general common-law-
making powers, federal courts in diversity cases could create
national regulatory standards. Federal judges ostensibly apply the
disparate substantive state law standards of the fifty states in the
259. See 151 CONG. REC. S1166 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2005) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
Defendants may not remove a case that otherwise meets the requirements for diversity
jurisdiction if one of them is a citizen of the state where the plaintiff files suit. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(b) (2000).
260. PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 255, at 7.
261. HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 147-48 (1973).
262. See Jerry Goldman & Kenneth S. Marks, Diversity Jurisdiction and Local Bias: A
Preliminary Empirical Inquiry, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 102-03 (1980).
263. Class Action Litigation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong.
97-98 (2002) [hereinafter Hearing] (prepared statement of Walter Dellinger, Professor,
O'Melveny & Myers, Washington, D.C.).
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class actions affected by CAFA.2"4 Perhaps latent in Professor
Dellinger's comment is the belief that, when confronted with a class
action potentially implicating the substantive laws of many states,
federal courts will choose to deny certification and thereby not apply
any state standards at all.
Even assuming that federal judges had some means to craft
uniform standards for state law cases, one wonders whether this
prospect truly motivated CAFA's backers. What injury doctrinal
disunity in tort, consumer protection, and other state laws inflicts
on interstate commerce is still uncertain.2"5 Indeed, corporate
interests often benefit from a multitude of substantive rules. As
discussed above, substantive disunity gave corporations an advan-
tage during the Swift Era. Even without a favorable federal rule
that preempts state law, a corporation can still benefit from having
at least two state standards to choose between when making its
choice-of-law argument in a particular case.2 6 Finally, the multi-
tude of state laws complicates choice of law and therefore makes
certification of multistate classes more difficult.
3. Interstate Federalism and Choice of Law
a. Interstate Federalism and the Probusiness Federal Courts
The uniformity rationale makes sense when viewed in light of
a third justification for CAFA. Echoing proponents of diversity
jurisdiction from eighty years ago, CAFA's supporters frequently
asserted that the federal courts somehow intuitively appreciate the
needs of a national economy better than state courts, and therefore
federal judges should supervise litigation that has such enormous
regulatory impact.26 7 This rationale ultimately rests on the percep-
tion of an emergent hostility in the federal courts to the certification
of multistate cases. If, as supporters believe, CAFA results in fewer
certified classes, uniformity is a less pressing concern. Fewer state
264. Id. at 102.
265. Compare Robert L. Rabin, Federalism and the Tort System, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 15
(1997), with Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 953 (3d Cir. 1980).
266. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Should Congress Engage in Tort Reform?, 1 MICH. L. &
POL'Y REV. 121,128 (1996).
267. See infra notes 271-74 and accompanying text.
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standards will apply at all to regulate commercial affairs, because
fewer large-scale classes will be certified and proceed to judgment.
Among CAFA's findings are the observations that class action
abuses have "adversely affected interstate commerce '' 68 and that
federalization would "benefit society by encouraging innovation and
lowering consumer prices. 2 69 According to one chief lobbyist, state
courts' inability to control class action abuse has wreaked economic
havoc.27 ° The federal courts, in contrast, won praise for their
guardianship of interstate commerce. The 2005 Senate Report
argued as follows:
Article III of the Constitution ensures that there will be a fair,
uniform, and efficient forum (a federal court) for adjudicating
interstate commercial disputes, so as to nurture interstate
commerce. Some scholars have persuasively argued that
diversity jurisdiction, of all the powers exercised under the
Constitution, has had the greatest influence in melding the
United States into a single nation, by fostering interstate
commerce, communication and the uninterrupted flow of capital
for investment into various parts of the Union, and sustaining
the public credit and the sanctity of private contracts.27'
This excerpt has deep roots in the Swift Era. It reproduces nearly
verbatim an identical argument from Judge Parker's 1932 article in
praise of Swift.272
CAFA's supporters gave their probusiness rationale a constitu-
tional gloss with the argument that state court supervision of large-
scale class actions violates federalism principles that assign such
regulation of interstate commerce to the federal government. 273 The
268. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(2)(B), 119 Stat. 4,4 (2005).
269. Id. § 2(b)(3), 119 Stat. at 5.
270. E.g., Rights for Participants in Class Action Suits: Hearing on H.R. 2341, The Class
Action Fairness Act of 2001, Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 2002 WL 188779 (2002)
(statement of John H. Beisner, Esq., O'Melveny & Myers LLP, Washington, D.C.) ("I have also
personally witnessed the enormous economic waste that this inexplicable situation imposes
on targeted companies, diverting attention and resources from job-creating innovation efforts
271. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 57 (2005) (emphasis added).
272. Parker, supra note 54, at 437.
273. One of CAFA's enumerated purposes is to "restore the intent of the framers of the
United States Constitution by providing for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of
national importance under diversity jurisdiction." Class Action Fairness Act § 2(b)(2), 119
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statute's proponents named the doctrine in support of this argument
"false federalism," although others have referred to it as interstate
federalism or horizontal federalism.274 This doctrine's roots in the
Constitution are uncertain. The interstate federalism justification
is better viewed not as an argument about the allocation of power
the Constitution requires but instead as an expression of CAFA
supporters' faith in federal courts' shared preferences.
The interstate federalism doctrine motivated two arguments
during debates. The first addressed the damage to one state's
sovereignty caused when a second state's court either applies its
own laws to the first state's citizens, as has happened in multistate
class actions;275 interprets and applies the first state's law;276 or,
through the coercive pressure of a large damages class action, forces
a manufacturer to hew to the most restrictive state's regulatory
regime.277 This version of the interstate federalism rationale made
Stat. at 5.
274. See WALTER DELLINGER, PROGRESSIVE POLICY INST., THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESSACT:
CURBING UNFAIRNESS AND RESTORING FAITH IN OUR JUDICIAL SYSTEM 6 (Mar. 2003),
http://www.ppionline.org/documents/ClassAction_0303.pdf (using "false federalism"); Robert
H. Abrams & Paul R. Dimond, Toward a Constitutional Framework for the Control of State
Court Jurisdiction, 69 MINN. L. REV. 75,99-100 (1984) (discussing this problem using the term
"interstate federalism"); Scott Fruehwald, The Rehnquist Court and Horizontal Federalism:
An Evaluation and a Proposal for Moderate Constitutional Constraints on Horizontal
Federalism, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 289 (2003); Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate
Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689 (1987).
275. See Hearing, supra note 263, at 100-01 (statement of Walter Dellinger, Professor,
O'Melveny & Myers LLP, Washington, D.C.) ("Under the current system, many state courts
faced with interstate class actions have undertaken to dictate the substantive laws of other
states by applying their own laws to all other states, resulting in a breach of federalism
principles by fellow states (not by the federal government). And because the state court
decision has binding effect everywhere by virtue of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the other
states have no way of revisiting the interpretation of their own laws."); 149 CONG. REC.
812885, 12886 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 2003) (statement of Sen. Grassley); see also S. REP. No. 109-
14, at 61 (2005) ("Why should a state court judge be able to overrule other state laws and
policies? Why should state courts be setting national policy?").
276. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 61 (2005) ("Why should a state court judge elected by the several
thousand residents of a small county in Alabama tell New York or California the meaning of
their laws?").
277. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. H687 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 2005) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte)
("So, in terms of restoring States' rights, that is exactly what this legislation does. It makes
sure that the rights of all 50 States are protected in the judicial proceedings related to class-
action lawsuits and that one State does not have the opportunity to establish policy that
directly affects other States."). For an example of this version of the interstate federalism
argument, see Michael S. Greve, Federalism's Frontier, 7 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 93, 100-01
(2002).
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its way into CAFA itself, whose findings complain that state courts
have "ma[de] judgments that impose their view of the law on other
States and bind the rights of residents of those States."27 Second,
CAFA backers insisted that state courts improperly trespass on
federal terrain when they control multistate class actions that
substantially affect interstate commerce.279
The state sovereignty version of the interstate federalism
argument-one state should not interfere with another's regulatory
powers-has an unclear relationship to the Constitution's federal-
ism architecture. Commentators have argued for a robust interstate
federalism restriction on state power, but acknowledge that the
Supreme Court has largely ignored possible sources for this
limit-the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the dormant Commerce
Clause-since the New Deal.28 ° In two recent punitive damages
decisions, the Supreme Court struck down large awards from state
courts based on conduct that was lawful in other states because the
awards violated principles of state sovereignty.281 The Court did not
clarify, however, which constitutional doctrine compelled these
limits on one state's power vis-A-vis the others.28 2
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has also
served as a venue for battles over interstate federalism. In World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodsen, the Supreme Court insisted
that "principles of interstate federalism" are "express or implicit in
both the original scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment," and that these principles limited the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants.2 3 The Court
quickly backed away from even this weak constraint on jurisdiction,
insisting two years later that the Due Process Clause "makes no
mention of federalism concerns."2 4 Moreover, even if World-Wide
278. Class Action Fairness Act § 2(a)(4)(C), 119 Stat. at 5.
279. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 24 (2005) ("Clearly, a system that allows state court judges to
dictate national policy on these and numerous other issues from the local courthouse steps
is contrary to the intent of the Framers when they crafted our system of federalism.").
280. See Fruehwald, supra note 274, at 291.
281. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,421 (2003); BMW of N.
Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572 (1996).
282. See Michael P. Allen, The Supreme Court, Punitive Damages, and State Sovereignty,
13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 21 (2004).
283. 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980).
284. Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03 &
n.10 (1982); see Allen R. Kamp, The Multistate Consumer Class Action: Local Solutions,
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Volkswagen's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment had
persisted, principles of interstate federalism would have required
only minimum contacts between a defendant and a state before
jurisdiction existed. In short, even under a robust interstate
federalism interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Constitution requires only some minimal relationship between a
state and a defendant before the state may legitimately exercise its
regulatory powers.2"5 Indeed, the interstate federalism limits on a
state applying its law outside its boundaries are arguably even
weaker than those governing personal jurisdiction.2 6 Certainly the
test for applying a state's law beyond its boundaries-that the state
have a "significant contact" with the conduct at issue2 7 -passes
World- Wide Volkswagen's interstate federalism threshold.
The prospect of a state court applying its own law to out-of-state
litigants, or interpreting and applying another state's law, is
typically something for choice-of-law rules, not the Constitution, to
sort out.2"' Do multistate class actions in state court present a
different order of choice-of-law concerns? That is, do a large number
of out-of-state class members magnify sovereignty threats that
cannot be resolved through proper choice-of-law analysis? Responses
to the Supreme Court's foray into these matters suggests that the
answer is no. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, the Supreme
Court ruled that Kansas law could not apply to a nationwide class,
because the state lacked a significant contact with each class
member. 9 Although the decision affirmed that some extraterrito-
National Problems, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 271, 289-92 (1985) (discussing Ireland's response to
Worldwide Volkswagen).
285. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306 (1992).
286. Although a state must have "significant contact" with the conduct at issue to apply its
law to regulate it, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981), "minimum contacts"
for personal jurisdiction and "significant contact" for choice of law do not have a common
denominator for the purposes of comparison. In Shaffer v. Heitner, the Court "rejected the
argument that if a State's law can properly be applied to a dispute, its courts necessarily have
jurisdiction over the parties to that dispute." 433 U.S. 186, 215 (1977).
287. Allstate, 449 U.S. at 313.
288. Cf. John N. Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal Jurisdiction, 68 IOWA L. REV.
1015, 1065 (1983) ("If there is a threat to federalism or state sovereignty in a multistate class
action, it comes from improper choice of law.... Effective limits on choice of law ... should
satisfy that concern.").
289. 472 U.S. 797, 821-22 (1985).
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rial applications of state law may violate the Due Process Clause,290
subsequent decisions confirm that it did not foreclose the possibility
that such choice-of-law determinations may be appropriate when
states do have the requisite contacts with class members.29' Indeed,
not long after Shutts, the ALI in 1993 proposed that courts should
choose a single state's law in these cases and identified the law of
the defendant's principal place of business as the correct default
rule to apply.292 Earlier Congresses have considered legislation that
would have encouraged federal courts to certify multistate mass tort
classes under a single state's law.
2 93
If the pre-CAFA class action regime placed states in conflict with
each other, state governments did not seem to mind. A number of
state high and appellate courts have affirmed the certification of
multistate classes under a single state's law.294 Moreover, the
National Conference of State Legislatures 29 and the National
Association of State Attorneys General 2  lobbied against the CAFA.
290. Id. at 822.
291. See, e.g., In re Lutheran Bhd. Variable Ins. Prods. Co. Sales Practices Litig., 201
F.R.D. 456,461 n.1 (D. Minn. 2001); In re LILCO Sec. Litig., 111 F.R.D. 663,669-70 (E.D.N.Y.
1986).
292. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 187, § 6.01 cmt. f.
293. Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra note 176, at 565-66 (discussing the legislation); see also
Robert A. Sedler & Aaron D. Twerski, The Case Against All Encompassing Federal Mass Tort
Legislation: Sacrifice Without Gain, 73 MARQ. L. REv. 76, 95 (1989) (criticizing this choice of
law rule).
294. E.g., Wershaba v. Apple Computer, Inc., 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 145, 160 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001) ("[A] California court may properly apply the same California statues at issue here to
non-California members of a nationwide class where the defendant is a California corporation
and some or all of the challenged conduct emanates from California."); Renaissance Cruises,
Inc. v. Glassman, 738 So. 2d 436, 439 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding application of
Florida law to a nationwide deceptive trade practices class); Martin v. Heinold Commodities,
Inc., 510 N.E.2d 840, 846-47 (Ill. 1987) ("[In] the instant case, it is apparent that Illinois
substantive law can be applied to resolve the underlying common factual dispute."); Peterson
v. BASF Corp., 618 N.W.2d 821, 826 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (certifying a nationwide class
pressing claims under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act); Ysbrand v. DaimlerChrysler
Corp., 81 P.3d 618 (Okla. 2003); Lobo Exploration Co. v. Amoco Prod. Co., 991 P.2d 1048, 1054
(Okla. Civ. App. 1999) (holding that Oklahoma consumer protection law could apply to a
nationwide class). A post-CAFA example is International Union of Operating Engineers Local
#68 Welfare Fund v. Merck Co., No. A-0450-05T1, 2006 WL 827285 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
Mar. 31, 2006).
295. Letter from Representative Kip Holden, Chair, Natl Conference of State Legislatures,
to Senator Orrin G. Hatch (June 21, 2000), available at http://www.ncsl.orgtstatefed/antis353.
htm [hereinafter Letter from Representative Kip Holden].
296. 151 CONG. REC. S1243 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
The former seemed more concerned with the vertical version of
federalism, attacking an earlier draft of the CAFA as "yet another
feeble and blatant attempt to unnecessarily federalize areas of
criminal and civil justice that do not beg for federal resolution" and
urging lawmakers "to reject this affront to judicial federalism. 297
The second version of the interstate federalism argument-that
state courts simply should not control cases with significant effect
on interstate commerce-has roots in a traditional constitutional
concern with the proper allocation of power between states and the
federal government. Its federalism foothold is nonetheless tenuous.
First, the text of the Constitution does not prohibit state regula-
tion of interstate commerce. As Justice Scalia has argued, the
Constitution provides that "it is for Congress to make the judgment
that interstate commerce must be immunized from certain sorts of
nondiscriminatory state action." '298 The dormant Commerce Clause,
the interstitial constitutional doctrine that limits states' regulatory
power, addresses state regulations that either discriminate or
unduly burden interstate commerce.29 No federal court has ever
held that multistate class actions in state courts violate the dormant
Commerce Clause.
Even if the Constitution or a modern-day interpretation of it does
not explicitly assign control over multistate cases to federal courts,
an isolated state court's application of one state's law to nationwide
conduct arguably offends a federal sensibility. But, judged by its
text alone, CAFA does not answer how federal court supervision of
these cases remedies interstate federalism problems and reduces
multistate class actions' impact on interstate commerce. CAFA is
procedural only and does not preempt substantive state law.3 °°
Federal courts will continue to apply state choice-of-law rules to
297. See Letter from Representative Kip Holden, supra note 295.
298. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 201 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
299. See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 125 S. Ct. 2419,2422-
23 (2005); City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 256, 285-86 (E.D.N.Y.
2004); Daniel A. Farber, State Regulation and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 3 CONST.
COMMENT. 395, 395-96 (1986).
300. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 61 (2005) ("[CAFA] simply allows more class action cases filed
in state court to be removed to federal court. [CAFA] does not change substantive law-it is,
in effect, a procedural provision only. As such, class action decisions rendered in federal court
should be the same as if they were decided in state court-under the Erie doctrine, federal
courts must apply state substantive law in diversity cases.").
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multistate class actions;"°1 if state courts applying these rules would
extend one state's law beyond its borders, so too should federal
courts. The Senate Report simply asserts that "matters of interstate
comity are more appropriately handled by federal judges,"' 2 but
why a federal imprimatur on certified multistate classes lessens
interstate federalism problems is not self-evident.
As was the case in the Progressive Era, no text holds the key to
the perceived effectiveness of diversity jurisdiction as a protector of
interstate commerce from meddlesome interference by state law.
Backers of diversity jurisdiction and Swift assumed that something
would guide the federal courts to mold the general common law in
favor of corporate interests.
CAFA supporters hint at an analogous modern-day assumption.
CAFA will solve the problem of interstate federalism because
"federal courts have exhibited particular sensitivity to the variations
in substantive law among the different states, in accordance with
core principles of federalism."" 3 The Senate Report contends that
the Supreme Court "has repeatedly warned that courts should not
attempt to apply the laws of one state to behaviors that occurred
in other jurisdictions."3 °4 Unlike state courts, federal courts "have
consistently heeded the Supreme Court's admonitions."3 5 Indeed,
the Report maintains, "over the past ten years, the federal court
system has not produced any final decisions-not even one-
applying the law of a single state to all claims in a nationwide or
multistate class action."30 6 Walter Dellinger echoed this praise of
federal courts: "In recent years, the federal courts have made heroic
efforts to halt the game playing with class actions."30 7
In short, even though CAFA does nothing more than put cases in
federal court, with no change to choice-of-law rules, Rule 23, or
301. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
302. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 61 (2005).
303. Hearing, supra note 263, at 102 (statement of Walter Dellinger, Professor, O'Melveny
& Myers LLP, Washington, D.C.).
304. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 62 (2003). The Report cites an 1892 and a 1914 case for this
proposition, as well as Shutts. Federal courts have refused to interpret Shutts as a per se bar
on certification. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
305. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 63. The evidence for the Senate Report's claim is doubtful. See,
e.g., O'Keefe v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 214 F.R.D. 266, 274 n.3 (E.D. Va. 2003) (discussing
federal decisions applying one state's law in nationwide class actions).
306. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 64.
307. DELLINGER, supra note 274, at 2.
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substantive standards, CAFA backers believe-with good reason, as
explained below-that the statute will cause fewer multistate
classes to be certified because federal judges share a disinclination
to certify these classes. If backers' perceptions are accurate, then
federalization under CAFA will help solve the interstate federalism
problem-or, rather, will help empower federal courts' business-
friendly preferences-by interposing shared judicial preferences
between class action defendants and their regulation by state law.
b. Does Federal Court Hostility Exist?
The Senate Report's claim that the federal courts have not
allowed a single multistate class action with one state's law
providing the rule of decision to proceed to final judgment is
misleading. More often than not, certified class actions settle, and
very few reach the summary judgment motion or trial stage."'
Nonetheless, the Senate Report's focus on federal courts' choice-of-
law practices reveals a great deal about the soil in which CAFA is
planted. Supporters' assumptions and a measurable change in
federal class action case law since Rhone-Poulenc, Castano, and
Georgine are two indicators that suggest that federal judges over the
past decade have developed a shared hostility to the certification of
multistate classes.
Several features of the federal judicial population as currently
composed are consistent with an emergent hostility to certain types
of class cases. A majority of the federal judiciary claimed Republican
affiliation by the mid-1990s. °9 Political ideology appears to play a
role in decision making.310 Perhaps relatedly, commentators have
identified an antiplaintiff bias among federal appeals judges.311
Just as lawyers during the Progressive Era assumed that federal
judges shared procorporate preferences, contemporary practitioners
believe that federal judges have less patience for state law class
308. WILLOING ETAL., supra note 202, at 60.
309. See Sheldon Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy: The Final Imprint, 76 JUDICATURE 282,
295 (1993).
310. See Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A Meta-
analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219, 243 (1999).
311. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Anti-plaintiff Bias in the Federal
Appellate Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 128, 131 (2000).
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actions than their state counterparts. A significant majority of 350
defense lawyers surveyed in a 2005 Federal Judicial Center study
reported that they believed federal judges would be less willing to
grant certification in state law cases.312 Plaintiffs' lawyers, in
contrast, thought that state court judges were more receptive to
their clients' interests.313 Another Federal Judicial Center study
reported that three-fourths of defense lawyers believed that federal
judges in class actions were more likely to rule in their clients'
interests than state judges, as compared to one-fourth of plaintiffs'
lawyers.314
A growing impatience with multistate class actions-perhaps a
corrective to the aggressive expansion of Rule 23 in the 1980s and
early 1990s-is a detectable phenomenon. Federal courts' treatment
of choice of law problems in multistate class actions, an indicium of
this trend, provides some support for these attorneys' beliefs. As
discussed above, choice of law in multistate cases has a significant
impact on class certification decisions. In the 1980s, federal courts
identified solutions to the choice-of-law conundrum, but, as noted,
plaintiffs' efforts to certify multistate classes suffered blows in the
Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits. 315 Although it is impossible to
quantify precisely the influence of a lower court's decision, two
measures suggest the extent to which Rhone-Poulenc, Castano, and
Georgine changed the landscape of federal courts' class action
jurisprudence. First, each decision has significant cross-circuit
application. Courts in almost every circuit have relied on Rhone-
Poulenc to deny certification in multistate class actions."' Castano
312. WILLGING & WHEATMAN, supra note 6, at 31.
313. Id. at 32-33. Although the Federal Judicial Center study reported no difference
between class certification rates in state and federal courts, it does not disaggregate its data
on certifications by type of class action, and therefore does not say whether the two sets of
courts would approach large, multistate class actions the same way. Id. at 40-41; see also id.
at 46 (comparing attorney perceptions to judicial practices).
314. WILLGING & WHEATMAN, supra note 163, at 29.
315. See supra notes 188-95 and accompanying text.
316. E.g., Sikes v. Teleline, Inc., 281 F.3d 1350, 1368 (11th Cir. 2002); Zinser v. Accufix
Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 2001); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d
1069, 1074 (6th Cir. 1996); In re Baycol Prods. Litig., 218 F.R.D. 197, 208 (D. Minn. 2003); In
re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 210 F.R.D. 61,65-66 & n.34 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Rothwell v. Chubb
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 191 F.R.D. 25, 33 n.7 (D.N.H. 1998); In re Ford Motor Co. Vehicle Paint
Litig., 182 F.R.D. 214, 222 (E.D. La. 1998); Arch v. Am. Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469, 486 n.14
(E.D. Pa. 1997); In re Stucco Litig., 175 F.R.D. 210, 216-17 (E.D.N.C. 1997); Harding v.
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and Georgine have also proven important authority for federal
courts across the country in decisions denying class certification.
1 7
Second, and perhaps more revealing, Rhone-Poulenc, Castano,
and Georgine may have initiated-and at least reflect-the federal
courts' retreat from earlier efforts to try to manage mass actions
involving state law causes of action in an aggregated fashion.
During the five years preceding the February 1995 Rhone-Poulenc
decision, federal courts denied that choice-of-law issues interfered
with certification of multistate classes much more frequently than
they ruled otherwise.31 During the five years after Rhone-Poulenc,
Tambrands Inc., 165 F.R.D. 623, 629 (D. Kan. 1996).
317. The Castano decision has been relied on to support a denial of class certification for
choice-of-law reasons by courts in a number of circuits. E.g., In re Baycol, 218 F.R.D. at 209-
10; Duncan v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 601, 613 (W.D. Wash. 2001); Clay v. Am. Tobacco
Co., 188 F.R.D. 483, 498 (S.D. Ill. 1999); Carpenter v. BMW of N. Am., No. 99-CV-214, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9272, at **20-21 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 1999); Emig v. Am. Tobacco Co., 184
F.R.D. 379, 393 n.15 (D. Kan. 1998); Rothwell, 191 F.R.D. at 33 n.7.
318. Among cases for the March 1990 to March 1995 period found by the author, the ratio
was approximately 2.5:1 in favor of finding no choice-of-law hurdle to class certification. In
the following cases, the district courts held that choice-of-law issues did not interfere with
class certification: Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544, 554 (E.D. La. 1995),
rev'd, 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996); Hickey v. Great Western Mortgage Corp., 158 F.R.D. 603,
613 (N.D. Ill. 1994); In re Phar-Mor, Inc. Securities Litigation, 875 F. Supp. 277, 280 (W.D.
Pa. 1994); In reMarion Merrell Dow Inc., Securities Litigation, No. 92-0609-CV-W-6, 1994 WL
396190, at *8 (W.D. Mo. July 18, 1994); Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 147
F.R.D. 51,58 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Endo v. Albertine, 147 F.R.D. 164, 169 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Simpson
v. Specialty Retail Concepts, 149 F.R.D. 94, 103 (M.D.N.C. 1993); In re Cordis Corp.
Pacemaker Product Liability Litigation, No. MDL 850, C-3-86-543, 1992 WL 754061, at *12
(S.D. Ohio Dec. 23, 1992); Elliott v. ITT Corp., 150 F.R.D. 569, 579-80 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Lerch
v. Citizens First Bancorp, Inc., 144 F.R.D. 247, 256-57 (D.N.J. 1992); In re United
Telecommunications, Inc., Securities Litigation, Civ. A. No. 90-2251-0, 1992 WL 309884, at
*4 (D. Kan. Sept. 15, 1992); Church v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., No. C-90-2290 DLJ,
1992 WL 370829, at **4-5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 1992); In re Badger Mountain Irrigation
District Securities Litigation, 143 F.R.D. 693, 700 (W.D. Wash. 1992); In re Revco Securities
Litigation, 142 F.R.D. 659, 666 (N.D. Ohio 1992); Persky v. Turley, Civ. Nos. 88-1830-PHX-
SMM, 88-2089-PMX-SMM, 1991 WL 329564, at *4 (D. Ariz. Dec. 20, 1991); South Carolina
National Bank v. Stone, 139 F.R.D. 325, 334 (D.S.C. 1991); In re Kirschner Medical Corp.
Securities Litigation, 139 F.R.D. 74, 84 (D. Md. 1991); Lai v. Anthony, Civ. Nos. 88-00565MP,
90-00828-DAE, 1991 WL 208443, at *8 (D. Haw. July 5, 1991); Fry v. UAL Corp., 136 F.R.D.
626, 631 (N.D. Ill. 1991); In re Crazy Eddie Securities Litigation, 135 F.R.D. 39, 41 (E.D.N.Y.
1991); Adair v. Sorenson, 134 F.R.D. 13, 20 (D. Mass. 1991); In re Atlantic Financial Federal
Securities Litigation, Civ. A. No. 89-0645, 1990 WL 188927, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 28, 1990); In
re MDC Holdings Securities Litigation, 754 F. Supp. 785,803-04 (S.D. Cal. 1990); Deutschman
v. Beneficial Corp., 132 F.R.D. 359, 379-80 (D. Del. 1990); In re Worlds of Wonder Securities
Litigation, No. C 87 5491 SC, 1990 WL 61951, at **4-5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 1990).
In the following cases, the district courts held that choice-of-law issues prevented or
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federal courts reversed course, and choice-of-law difficulties
hampered class certification more often than not.31' No change in
interfered with class certification: Kurczi v. Eli Lilly & Co., 160 F.R.D. 667, 674 (N.D. Ohio
1995); McBride v. Galaxy Carpet Mills, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 1278, 1286 (N.D. Ga. 1995); In re
SciMed Securities Litigation, Civ. No. 3-91-575, 1993 WL 616692, at *7 (D. Minn. Sept. 29,
1993); Sunbird Air Services., Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., Civ. A. No. 89-2181-V, 1992 WL
193661, at **5-6 (D. Kan. July 15, 1992); Wesley v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., No. 91
C 3368, 1992 WL 57948, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 1992); Tapken v. Brown, No. 90-691-CIV-
MARCUS, 1992 WL 178984, at *31 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 1992); Antonson v. Robertson, 141
F.R.D. 501,508-09 (D. Kan. 1991); Margolis v. Caterpillar, Inc., 815 F. Supp. 1150, 1153 (C.D.
Ill. 1991); Church v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., No. C-90-2290 DLJ, 1991 WL 284083, at
**12-13 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 1991); Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 130 F.R.D. 260, 271 (D.D.C.
1990).
In the following cases, the district courts mentioned choice of law, but it did not have any
material impact on their decisions: In re Synergen, Inc. Securities Litigation, 154 F.R.D. 265,
267 (D. Colo. 1994); In re One Bancorp Securities Litigation, 136 F.R.D. 526, 533 (D. Me.
1991); Strain v. Nutri/System, Inc., Civ. A. No. 90-2772, 1990 WL 209325, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec.
12, 1990).
319. Among cases for the March 1945 to March 2000 period found by the author, the ratio
had changed to 1.7:1 in favor of denying certification based in part on choice-of-law concerns.
In the following cases the courts held that choice-of-law issues did not interfere with class
certification: In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Products Liability
Litigation, 55 F.3d 768, 817-18 (3d Cir. 1995); In re Great Southern Life Insurance Co. Sales
Practices Litigation, 192 F.R.D. 212, 217 (N.D. Tex. 2000); Koppel v. 4987 Corp., 191 F.R.D.
360, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Mowbray v. Waste Management Holdings, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 194, 199-
200 (D. Mass. 1999); In re Diet Drugs Products Liability Litigation, No. CIV. A. 98-20626,
1999 WL 673066, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 1999); In re Synthroid Marketing Litigation, 188
F.R.D. 295, 302 (N.D. Ill. 1999); In re Hartford Sales Practices Litigation, 192 F.R.D. 592,607
n.14 (D. Minn. 1999); Bussie v. Allmerica Financial Corp., 50 F. Supp. 2d 59, 71 (D. Mass.
1999); Garner v. Healy, 184 F.R.D. 598, 605 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Bunnion v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., No. Civ. A. 97-4877, 1998 WL 372644, at *9 (E.D. Pa. May 14, 1998); Singer v. AT &
T Corp., 185 F.R.D. 681, 691 (S.D. Fla. 1998); Leszczynski v. Allianz Insurance, 176 F.R.D.
659, 672 (S.D. Fla. 1997); In re Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc., 172 F.R.D. 271, 293 (S.D.
Ohio 1997); Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 164 F.R.D. 391, 399 (D.N.J. 1996); Kline v.
First Western Government Securities, Inc., No. CIV.A. 83-1076, 1996 WL 153641, at *8 (E.D.
Pa. Dec. 21, 1995); In re BellAtlantic Corp. Securities Litigation, No. 91-514, 1995 WL 733381,
at *7 n.8 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 1995); Rosen v. Fidelity Fixed Income Trust, 169 F.R.D. 295, 302
(E.D. Pa. 1995); In re Copley Pharmaceutical, Inc., 161 F.R.D. 456, 464-65 (D. Wyo. 1995).
In the following cases, the courts held that choice-of-law issues prevented or interfered with
class certification: Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 741 (5th Cir. 1996);
Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 630 (3d Cir. 1996); Cunningham v. PFL Life
Insurance Co., No. C-98-67 MJM, 1999 WL 33656879, at **4-5 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 25, 1999);
Velasquez v. Crown Life Insurance Co., Nos. CIV. A. No. M-97-064, MDL 1096, 1999 WL
33305652, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 1999); Clay v. American Tobacco Co., 188 F.R.D. 483, 497
(S.D. IlI. 1999); Carpenter v. BMW of North America, Inc., No. CIV. A. 99-CV-214, 1999 WL
415390, at *7 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 1999); Emig, 184 F.R.D. at 393; Dhamer v. Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co., 183 F.R.D. 520, 532 (N.D. Ill. 1998); In re Jackson National Life Insurance Co.
Premium Litigation, 183 F.R.D. 217, 223 (W.D. Mich. 1998); Weikel v. Tower Semiconductor
Ltd., 183 F.R.D. 377, 402 (D.N.J. 1998); Chin v. Chrysler Corp., 182 F.R.D. 448, 457 (D.N.J.
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the substance of Rule 23 or any federal statutory enactment
explains this about-face. Obviously, the district courts in the Third,
Fifth, and Seventh Circuits must follow Rhone-Poulenc and its
progeny, but rules of precedent do not bind the numerous lower
courts in other circuits that have chosen to follow these decisions'
lead. The federal courts' emergent difficulty with choice-of-law
problems indicates that the federal courts share the Seventh
Circuit's notably hostile attitude to these cases.Y
The federal courts' recent choice-of-law decisions played a
significant role as a motor behind CAFA.3 21 Rhone-Poulenc and its
progeny appeared prominently in the debates over the statute.322
Most revealingly, congressional Democrats on the penultimate day
1998); Marascalco v. International Computerized Orthokeratology Society, Inc., 181 F.R.D.
331, 339 (N.D. Miss. 1998); Fisher v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 181 F.R.D. 365, 369 (N.D. Ill.
1998); Rothwell v. Chubb Life Insurance Co. of America, 191 F.R.D. 25, 33 n.7 (D.N.H. 1998);
Poe v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. Civ Al:96-CV-358-RLV, 1998 WL 113561, at *2 (N.D. Ga.
Feb. 13, 1998); Bradshaw v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 1:93 CV 1619, 1997 WL 33446663, at *2 (N.D.
Ohio Oct. 31, 1997); Fischler v. AmSouth Corp., 176 F.R.D. 583, 589 (M.D. Fla. 1997); In re
Ford Motor Co. Ignition Switch Products Liability Litigation, 174 F.R.D. 332, 351 (D.N.J.
1997); Smith u. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 174 F.R.D. 90, 95-96 (W.D. Mo. 1997);
Rohlfing v. Manor Care, Inc., 172 F.R.D. 330, 341 (N.D. Ill. 1997); In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco
II Product Liability Litigation, 177 F.R.D. 360, 371-72 (E.D. La. 1997); In re Masonite Corp.
Hardboard Siding Products Liability Litigation, 170 F.R.D. 417,423-24 (E.D. La. 1997); Haley
v. Medtronic, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 643, 653-54 (C.D. Cal. 1996); lhardt v. A.O. Smith Corp., 168
F.R.D. 613, 621 (S.D. Ohio 1996); Commander Properties Corp. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 164
F.R.D. 529, 541 (D. Kan. 1995).
In the following cases, the district courts mentioned choice of law, but it did not have any
material impact on their decisions: Cohn v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co., 189
F.R.D. 209, 213 n.7 (D. Conn. 1999); Cullen v. Whitman Medical Corp., 188 F.R.D. 226, 235-36
(E.D. Pa. 1999); In re New England Mutual Life Insurance Co. Sales Practices Litigation, 183
F.R.D. 33, 42 (D. Mass. 1998); Cavaliere v. Margaretten & Co., No. 94CVO 1928 (AHN), 1996
WL 571178, at *4 (D. Conn. July 10, 1996); Bishop v. Saab Automobile A.B., No. CV 95-0721
JGD (JRX), 1996 WL 33150020, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 1996).
320. For an example of the Seventh Circuit's hostility to class actions, see generally In re
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002). Professor Mary Davis agrees that
Rhone-Poulenc, Castano, and Georgine heralded a change; she claims other federal courts
were "intimidated by" the trio, not that the decisions activated a latent hostility. See Mary J.
Davis, Toward the Proper Role for Mass Tort Class Actions, 77 OR. L. REV. 157, 211 (1998).
321. Others have identified choice of law as particularly important for CAFA. See Richard
Nagareda, Bootstrapping in Choice of Law After the Class Action Fairness Act, 74 UMKC L.
REV. 601, 683 (2006); Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions After the Class Action Fairness Act
of 2005, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1593, 1610 (2006); Patrick Woolley, Erie and Choice of Law After the
Class Action Fairness Act, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1723, 1749 (2006); see also S. REP. No. 109-14, at
86 (2005).
322. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 235, at 111 n.4 (statement of Stephen G. Morrison,
General Counsel, Policy Management Systems Corp., Columbia, S.C.).
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of debate in the Senate proposed the following amendment to
neutralize the choice-of-law rationale for denying class certification:
Notwithstanding any other choice of law rule, in any class
action, over which the district courts have jurisdiction, asserting
claims arising under State law concerning products or services
marketed, sold, or provided in more than 1 State on behalf of a
proposed class, which includes citizens of more than 1 such
State, as to each such claim and any defense to such claim-
(1) the district court shall not deny class certification, in
whole or in part, on the ground that the law of more than
1 State will be applied
As one Democratic senator explained, "[i]f we are going to take away
the right of State judges to hear a class action, it is incumbent upon
us to make sure the Federal judge is not able to not certify the class
because too many state laws would apply. That would be an unfair
result." '324 He then introduced a letter into the record from Arthur
Miller, who suggested that the amendment would guide federal
courts toward selecting a single state's law to apply in these cases.
The amendment, Professor Miller insisted, was necessary to "ensure
that [CAFA] does not lead to the unintended consequence of robbing
from consumers their only avenue to seek redress from corporations
that violate the law. 325
CAFA supporters' reactions revealed the role they expected choice
of law to play in making CAFA effective. The statute's chief sponsor
in the Senate argued that the proposed amendment would "nickel[]
and dimeo" the bill "to death. '326 'Pure and simple," he insisted,
"this amendment blows a hole in the bill and guts the modest
reforms we are finally going to be able to get to the President. '"327
Others joined in this chorus. One senator insisted that the amend-
ment would "perpetuat[e] the very magnet court abuses that the
legislation seeks to end. 3 28 Another accurately labeled the amend-
323. 151 CONG. REC. S1166 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2005).
324. Id. at S1167, 1168 (statement of Sen. Bingaman).
325. Id. at S1169, 1170 (letter from Arthur R. Miller, Professor, Harvard Law School).
326. Id. at S1171 (statement of Sen. Grassley).
327. Id.
328. Id. at S1174 (statement of Sen. Sessions).
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ment "a poison pill."'329 Not surprisingly, the proposed amendment
did not pass. With its failure, the federal courts have been left to
their own devices insofar as their preferences will effect the certif-
ication of multistate classes.
C. CAFA's Unconstitutional Spirit?
The most likely reason why the federalization of multistate
classes proved attractive to CAFA's backers matches an important
rationale supporters gave for diversity jurisdiction during the
Progressive Era-the perception that federal courts' shared pref-
erences favored corporate interests. Given some indication that
federal judges do indeed share these tendencies, CAFA, like the
general common law, may well help limit the regulatory reach
of state law. There is, however, an important difference between
the two. CAFA, unlike the Swift regime, came from Congress. The
power to expand diversity jurisdiction for most multistate class
actions likely is well within Congress's constitutional authority. The
only apparent limit the Constitution places on Congress's steward-
ship of diversity jurisdiction is that the parties be minimally
diverse, and CAFA provides for this.33° Arguably a deficit of
democratic legitimacy is present when Congress cloaks its substan-
tive goal of limiting liability for state law causes of action in a
procedural guise. However, few participants in the debate over
CAFA naively believed the statute intended simply to reshape
procedure.3 1 Moreover, procedural change is often intended to have
a substantive impact. 32
CAFA is a different breed of procedural reform, however, and in
its difference lies the sort of problem Erie addressed-the impact
federal judges' policy preferences have on the federalism balance of
power. Often the substantive intent of a procedural change is
implicit within the text of the statute or rule itself. For example,
329. 151 CONG. REC. S1080, 1082 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. Lott).
330. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530 (1967); C. Douglas
Floyd, The Limits of Minimal Diversity, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 613, 658-59 (2004).
331. E.g., 149 CONG. REC. E1281 (daily ed. June 17, 2003) (statement of Rep. Udall); 145
CONG. REC. S1166 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1999) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
332. See generally Jack B. Weinstein, Procedural Reform as a Surrogate for Substantive
Revision, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 827 (1993).
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the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act (LARA), which the House of
Representatives passed in 2005, would have increased disincentives
for filing civil actions by putting more teeth into Rule 1 l's sanction
provision.33 The statute would tell federal judges when to impose
sanctions;3 4 indeed, it is designed to reduce judicial discretion in
this regard.335 Rule 68 is another example. If a plaintiff refuses a
settlement offer but ultimately recovers less than the proposed
amount, the plaintiff must pay the litigation costs the defendant
incurred after making the offer. 336 It is plainly designed to encour-
age early settlement by increasing pressure on plaintiffs. 3 7 A risk-
averse plaintiff may well abandon a meritorious claim for an
insubstantial sum in response to a Rule 68 offer, rather than fear
that it might have to shoulder a large bill for costs. Again, the
substantive goal lurks in the text itself.
In contrast, CAFA simply expands diversity jurisdiction. It does
not give federal judges any instruction in how they should decide
class certification motions in multistate cases. Unlike LARA or Rule
68, its substantive effectiveness depends on whether federal judges
share preferences for the proper management of class actions, and
how these preferences will impact litigation. If these preferences
exist, as the shift in federal choice-of-law decisions over the past
decade suggests they do, CAFA's expansion of diversity jurisdiction
will achieve a substantive end only because these preferences
militate against the certification of large, multistate classes.
Obviously, judicial antagonism toward the aggressive use of Rule
23 will not mean the end of state law enforcement. Class actions
represent quite a small subset of state law civil actions. But their
importance for the enforcement of state law in a range of cases,
particularly those that involve claims for small amounts, is well-
established.33 Perhaps nothing reflects the enforcement role class
actions play for state law quite as much as arguments that these
333. H.R. 420, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
334. Id. § 2(2)(B).
335. See 151 CONG. REC. H9287, 9288 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 2005) (letter from Leonidas Ralph
Mecham, Secretary, Judicial Conference of the United States, to F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
336. FED. R. CIv. P. 68.
337. E.g., McDowall v. Cogan, 216 F.R.D. 46, 47 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
338. See WILLGING ET AL., supra note 202, at 13 (observing that in few of the class actions
studied would individuals prosecute their claims absent class certification).
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cases result in illegitimate regulation through litigation.339 If it
works as intended, CAFA will use judicial hostility to certain types
of class actions to weaken the regulatory effect of state law.
CAFA thus rests on the hope that shared preferences among
federal judges-not positive instructions, either procedural or
substantive, from a law or a rule-will tip the federalism balance to
weaken state power. Erie attempted to minimize the role judicial
preferences play in diversity cases. In this sense, CAFA is Erie's
mirror image.
Erie's constitutional analysis rests on two foundations: federalism
and separation of powers. The decision expressed a message about
proper governance in a federalist system. Congress could take away
powers otherwise reserved to the states when so authorized under
the Constitution, but federal courts, acting alone without instruction
from Congress, could not. The general common law entailed a
judicial usurpation of state and congressional power and thus had
no constitutional support. In comparison, CAFA rests on sturdier
ground.34 ° Congress has decided to take from state courts the
authority to supervise multistate class actions. Although this
decision impacts the federalism balance, it was made by the political
branch, the proper actor by Erie's metric.
In another sense, though, CAFA bears some of Swift's constitu-
tional pockmarks. Rather than displace state substantive law, or
even amend Rule 23 to make class certification more difficult,
Congress has punted to the courts and empowered federal judges'
preferences to limit state law's substantive impact. Contrary to
Erie's intent, CAFA makes the beliefs of the unelected branch, a
branch with no structural federalism protections, a key factor in the
federalism equation.
CONCLUSION
It is much too soon to tell if CAFA will have the corporate-friendly
federalism effect its supporters intend. The pendulum may swing
339. E.g., Michael I. Krauss, Regulation Masquerading as Judgment: Chaos Masquerading
as Tort Law, 71 MiSS. L.J. 631, 685 (2001).
340. For an argument that CAFA is unconstitutional, see generally C. Douglas Floyd, The
Inadequacy of the Interstate Commerce Justification for the Class Action Fairness Act, 55
EMORY L.J. 487 (2004).
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back, and federal judges may once again prove receptive audiences
for multistate class actions. Moreover, whether CAFA will have any
discernible effect on the success rates of these cases is unclear. The
perception of a corporate-friendly judiciary may prove inaccurate.
Federal judges may not have differed from their state counter-
parts in terms of shared attitudes during the Progressive Era.
341
Similarly, it has not been established as an empirical matter that,
generally speaking, federal judges and state judges approach class
actions differently.342 Also, CAFA allows for single-state class
actions in state court, so large cases in California or New York, for
example, may compensate for regulation lost to the statute.
At the least, however, legislators premised CAFA on the federal-
ism implications of diversity jurisdiction that Erie tried to neutral-
ize. If the statute works as intended, federal judicial distaste for
multistate class certification-not some substantive instruction
from Congress-will ultimately weaken state regulation. Erie
suggests that power to have this federalism impact should rest in
Congress's hands, not the courts'. One wonders if the "course
pursued" under CAFA will engender the same sort of heated debate
over the proper extent of federal courts' reach into state affairs that
the general common law sparked in the decades before Erie.
341. Urofsky, supra note 47, at 91.
342. WILLGING & WHEATMAN, supra note 6, at 9-10.
2007] 1313
